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PREFACE 
fbe primary purpose ot this thesis is to present G. W. 
Leibniz's conceptions of time, namely the Platonic and the 
relational. In this thesis, the interpretation ot the 
Plavonic conception is limited to the extent that it is 
developed in terms ot Leibniz's own system. This is to say 
that the conoeption is not developed in teroe ot its related-
ness to Plato• s :lH!ttUf!e In regard to the relational con-
ception, the path followed was that or confronting Isaac 
Newton instead of Samuel Clark. If the path followed had 
been that of confronting Clark, it seems that another 
interpretation, involving the problem or God to a greater 
extent, might nave been worked out. 
11 
the translations used within the body of this paper are 
those ot Philip Wiener in his ~eibniz Seleotions, except tor 
the Leibni§-Olark Cor:respondtnce vbere the translation ot 
H. G. Alexander was used and for the New §!s&s Con9.ernin5 
Hga.n Understandins where the translation of Alfred Langley 
was used. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'!'his paper is a study of Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von 
Leibniz's conceptions of time. It is the writer's view, and 
subsequently the View ot this paper, that Leibniz holds two 
quite different conceptions. The first may be named hie 
Platonic conception, whereas the second may be naoed his 
relational conception. 
Leibniz's Platonic conception of time is considered in 
chapter one. The conception itself is expreaeed briefly by 
Leibniz in his essay De rerum o~isinatione radicali dated 
November 23, 169?. Within the essay, time and place a.re viewed 
as the receptivity or the capacity of the world, that is, 
the ground upon which the world can be most easily built. 
This essay, according to Paul Schrecker in his paper nr.eibniz 
and the Timaeu.§ 0 wbioh appeared in the Review of MetaPb;[sics, 
VI, June, 1951, sb.ows Leibniz's Platonic inspiration. Thus 
the vinw of time considered within chapter one is termed the 
Platonic conception, although it does not receive analysis 
as it stands related to Plato's view of time in the V.maeus. 
Rather, it is presented in terms or Leibniz's system. The 
relationship of God and the possible worlds within His ideas, 
one ot which he actualizes (the best possible world) in view 
of the principles ot continuity and identity or indiscernibles, 
is discussed. 
The relational conception of time is the conception that 
1 
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Leibniz is most known tor. Its expression is found :xminly in 
the Leibniz-Clark Corrgs12ondence. Isaac Newton, as well as 
Saauel Clark are holders of the absolute conception of time. 
It is true th&t Samuel Clark is Newton's spokesman and defen-
der in the +·eibn1z-Clark Corrt:taI?ondence. Yet, it seems possible 
to maintain that Clark presents his own view of time in addition 
to defending that of Newton. In chapter two or this paper, 
which chapter considers the d.if f'erent1ation between the a.bao-
1 ute view of time and the relational View ot time, Leibniz's 
relational view of time is presented as it stands related to 
Isaac tfewtou • s absolute view o! time. Given this, the .?hilo-
so2hiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica has been used as the 
source or Newton's view ot time, instead of the Leibniz-Clark 
Corresi:ondence. 
To present the relational view of time, a discuaaion of 
the r)eibnizian monads and ":phenomena." is neoeasi tated. Time 
is shown in chapter two to be an ideal thing, given the factor 
of the monads not being in time. Time is, accordingly, an 
idealization of the existinf~ relations amr.mg "phenomena.'' In 
relationship to tho absolute view, it ia conolw'led that Leibniz 
holds a view of time which is a relative, sensible, apparent 
measure. 
Chapter three ot this paper grows out ot consideration 
ot the points or comparison (listed in chapter two, subsection 
11) between the relational view and the absolute view ot tilre. 
The focus of the chapter is on the relational view again, but 
in the sense of developing with greater depth the neaning of 
the relational conception. To do this, reliance has been 
3 
made upon Leibniz• e New ?§says Concernint~ Human Unde::-si;U.ndin3, 
especially with regard to the problems of duration, infinity 
and eternity. Here an attempt is made to grasp further the 
meaning of time as an idealization of the relations atlong 
things actually existing. 
Again involving the relational conception or time, chapter 
tour considers the question as to why it ia not meaningful, 
on Leibniz's view, to raise the question as to what moment of 
time the world was created. '!he question itself occupies an 
important place in the Leibn11-Clark CorresRondence. 
CHAP.1.'ER ONE 
TirlE VIEW'ED AD THE HECEF-TI VITY on CAP'ilCITY OF 'l1HE 1./0HI.1D 
The task of this chapter is to consider Leibniz•o Pla-
tonic conception ot time. Within this chapter, the conception 
is developed in terms of Leibniz'a metaphysical system. The 
approach is one of discussing first, the relationship of God 
and the possible worlds within His ideas and second, time s.o 
the receptivity or capacity ot the world. This being aaid, 
let us now turn to a consideration of the relationship of God 
and the possible worlds within His ideas. 
God is the center ot Leibniz•s metaphysical system. Ae 
the first substance, His existence follows upon His essence. 
The existence of the other substances depends upon Him. Let 
us therefore examine the nature of this dependency. 
Prior to creation ot this actual world, there were an 
infinity of possible worlda1 existing in the mind of God. God 
"contemplatesn all the possible worlds (or aeries of possible 
things) and after contemplating, selects one tor actualization. 
1
" ••• Aliquam in rebus possibilibus, aeu in ipaa poaslt.li-
tate val easentia ease exigentiam exiatentiae, vel (ut sic 
dicam) praetenaionem ad exiatendum et, ut verbo complectar, 
essentiam per se tendere ad exiatentiam. :Jnde porro sequitur, 
omnia possibilia, seu esaentiam vel realitatem poasibilem ex-
primentia, pari jure ad essentiam tend.ere pro quantitate essen-
tiae seu realitatia, vel pro gradu pertectionis quem 1nvolYUnt; 
eat enim pertactio nihil aliud. quam esaen'biate quant1tas." 
o. I. Gerhardt, ed., Die ~hiloso~hiechen Sohritten von Gott-
fried Wilhelm Leibn1!• fo • VI! Berlin, IA9t.'5,, p. 30,. 
4 
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Ao Leibniz states: 
••• There is in possible things, that is, in the very 
possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of 
existence, and, so to speak, some claio to existence; 
in a word, that essence tends of itself towards 
existence. Whent'le it turther follows th.at all pos-
sible things, whether expressing essence or possible 
reality, tend by equal right toward existence, accord-
ing to their quaatit7 of essence or reality, or accord-
ing to the degree ot pertection which they contain, ~ 
tor perfection is nothing else than quantity of essonce.G 
And 0 ••• among the in.finite combinations ot possibles a11d 
possible series, that one actually existo by which the most 
or essence or ot possibility 1.s brought into existence. 113 
out of the infinite possible worlds, there is, in fact, a 
beet possible world. 0 ••• It there were no best possible 
series, God would certainly have created nothing, since be 
4 oannot aot without reason, or prefer the leas perfect to 
211ut autem paulo d1at1nctius explicemus, quomodo ex veri-
tatibus aeternia sivi easential1bus vel metaphyeic1s oriant-ur 
veritates temporales, oont1ngentes sive phyaicae, priaum 
agnosoere debemus eo ipeo, quod aliquid potiua existit quam 
nihil, aliquam in rebus possibilibus seu in ipsa possibilitate 
vel easentia esse exigentiam existentiae, vel (ut sic dioam) 
pra.ete.nsionem ad existendum et, ut verbo complecatar. essentiam 
per ae tendere ad existentiam. Unde porro sequitur, omnia 
posa1bilia 1 seu essentiam vel ~ealitatem poasibilem expr1mentia 1 
pari jure ad essentiam tendere pro quantite essentiae seu 
realitatis, vel pro gradu perteotionis quem involvunt; est 
enim pertectio nihil aliud quam essentiae quantitao." Ibid. 
'"Hine vero manifeatissime intelligitur ex infin1t1s 
possibilium combinationibus seriebusque posaibilibus existere 
eam. per qua.m plurimum essentiae seu possibilitatis perd.uoitur 
ad existendum." Ibid. 
4ct. Ibid., VIIt P• 393. 1'herein Leibni:i states: "19. 
Et la pertection de D1eu demande que toutes sea aot1one aoyen~ 
contormes a sa sages$e, et qu•on ne puisae point luy reprocber 
d'avoir agi sans raison. ou mime d'avoir pretere une raison 
plus toible a une raison plus forte. 0 
Number nineteen ref era to the paragraph number in the 
Leibniz-Clark Correspondence. · 
the more perfact •••• "5 
6 
Given this, what are the criteria of. perteotion which 
suggest to God, that there is n beet possible world? 
••• Perfection is to be plaoed in form [i.e., as the 
context shows, in quantity of for.ms], or varietY'; 
whence it follows that matt~r. ia not everywhere uni-
form, but is diversified by assuming different torm.s; 
otherwise, aa much variety H.u possible wm1ld not be 
realized •••• It follows likewise that that series 
prevails through which thera can arine the ~reateat 
poaaibil1ty ot thinking of things as distinct (dis-
tiicta coe;itabilitae) ••• The actm1l universit is the 
co !ection6o? the possibles which torma the richest composite. 
God actualizes the maximum number or things. through utili-
zation of the simplest ls.we, which laws number two: 
(l) Principle ot Continuity • 
••• There is a perteot continuity reigning in the 
order of successive things, so there is a s113ilar 
order in simultaneous things, which taot establishes 
the plenum as real, and consigns empty spaces to 
imaginary realms. In things existing simultaneously 
there ma)' be continuity even though the imagination 
perceives only breaks; because many things appear to 
our eyes to be completely dissimilar and disunited 
which nevertheless turn out to be perfectly similar 
and unitiect,internally if we could got to know them 
distinctly. 
'"Meo judicio, niai daretur series optima, nihil plane 
crearet Deus quia non potest agere praeter rationem, qut prae-
.terre minus perrectum alteri pertectioni." ~b!d., II, pp. 424-25. 
60 (11) '.1!:xist1t ergo pertectissimum, cwa nihil aliud. sit 
qua.m quantitaa realitatia. (12) Porro per.tectio non in sola 
materia collocanda est, seu in replente tempus et spatium, 
oujus quocumque modo eadem fuisset qua11ti tas, sed ill tor1aa seu 
varietate. {13) Unde jam consequitur materiam non ubique s1b1 
similem ease, sed per rormas reddi dissimilarem, alioqui non 
tantum obt1neretur varietatis quantum posset. Ut taceam quod 
alibi demonstrav1, nulla alioque diversa phaenomena ease exti-
tura. (14) Senuitur etiam eam praevaluiese seriem, per qu.:lll 
plurimum oriretur diatinctae cogitabilitatia." Ibig., VII. p. 290. 
?A. Buchenau and Ernst Caseirer, ed., G, W. Le1bnis Pbilo-
sothieches Werke, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1924) PP• ~~59 quote! tn 
ni lip Wiener, ed., Leibniz Selections (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 195!} P• iag. 
---
? 
(2) The Identity of Indiscernible& • 
••• '!'here are not in nature two real, absolute beings, 
indiscernible from eaob other; because if there were, 
God and m1ture would act without reason, in ordering 
the one otherwise than the other; and ••• theretore God 
does not produce two p1ecea of matt~r perfectly equal 
and alike.a 
What is it that is to be filled with the greatest amount 
of existence (the greatest number of possibles actualized) by 
use ot the simplest laws? Ttle answer is, time and place. 
Time and place are the reoeptivit~ or the capacity ot the 
world, that is, the ground upon which the world can be most 
easil:r built. As Leibniz himself" eta.tea: 
••• '?here ie always in things a principle ot deter-
mination which ie baaed on consideration of maximum 
and minimum. such that the greatest effect is obtained 
with the lea.st, so to speak, expenditure. And here 
the time, the place, or in a word, the receptivity or 
capacity of the world may be considered as the expen-
diture or the ground upon which the world can be ~ost 
easily built •••• The matter itself may be compared to 
certain games where all the spaces 9n a table are to 
be filled according to determined laws, and where, 
unless a certain skill be employed, you will be fin-
ally excluded by unfavorable spaces and forced to \eave 
many more places empty than you intended or wished. 
But there is a c..erta1n way otfLlling most easily the 
most space. Just aa, therefore, if we have to cake 
a triangle, there being no other detertdninrr reason, 
it will be an equilateral one;. and if we have to !O 
from one point to another, without an1 turther deter-
mination a.a to the way, the easiest and shortest path 
will be chosen; so it being once> posited that being 
is better than not being, or that there ia a reason 
821. Il taut avouer que ce grand Principe, quoyqu•11 ait 
ote roconnu, n'a pas ete assez employe. ~ c'est en bonne par-
tie la raison pourquo;y ~uqu'ioy la Philosophie premiere a ete 
si peu teconde, et ai peu deaonetrative. J'en infere entre 
autres consequences, qu'il n'y a point dans la Nature deux .Etre$, 
ref!ls absolus indiscernables: paree que s'il y en avoit, Dieu · 
et la Nature agiroient sans raison, en traitant l'un autrement 
que l'autre; et au ainsi Dieu ne produ1t point duex portions 
de matiere parfaitement egalee et semblables." Gerhardt, 
Pltilosopbiecht Schriften, VII, p. 393. 
why something rather th'9.n nothing should be, or that 
we must pass fro:n the pos:Jihle to the actual, it fol-
lows that, even if' nothint:; tn1".'ther is determined, 1j1:c 
quantity of existence must be as great as possible, 
regard being had to the capacity o! the time and of 
the place (or to the poasiolo order or. existence), 
exactly aa tiles are disposed in a given area in such 
a Wa::f that it ~hall contain the greate3t number 0£ 
them possible.~ 
In View of Leibniz's brief statement of time, 10 as that 
9"Hinc vero manitestissime intellig1tur ex 1nr.1nitis possi-
bilium combinationibus seriebusque posaibilibus exiatere eam, per 
quam plurimum essentiae seu possibilitatia perducitur ad exiaten-
dum.. Semper scilicet eat in rebus principium determinationes 
quod a Maximo Minimove petandum est, ut nempe maximus praeste-
tur effeotus, minimo ut sic dioam suntu. Et hoc loco tempue, 
locus, aut ut verbo dioam, receptivitaa vel aapacitas mundi 
haberi potest pro sumtu sive terreno, in quo quam cocmodissime 
est aedit1oandu.m, forurum. autem varietates respondent co.nmo-
di tati aeditioii mult1tud1nique et elegantiae ca.merarum. Et 
sese res habet ut in ludis quibusdam, cum looa omnia in Tabula 
aunt replenda secundum certas leges, ubi niai artificio quodam 
uta.re, postremo spatiis exclusus iniquis, plura cogeris loea 
relinquere vacua, quam poteras vel volebas. Oerta autem ratio 
est per quam repletio maxima facillime obti.netur. Uti ergo 
si ponam.ua decretum ease ut fiat triangulum, nulla licet alia 
accidenti determinand.1 ratione, consequens est, aequilaterum 
prodire; et posito tendendum esse a puncto ad punct·um, licet 
nihil ultra iter determinat, via elegetur ~axime facilis sou 
brevissima; ita posito aemel ens praevalere non-anti, seu ratio-
nem esae cur aliquid potius extiterit quam nibil, sive u pos-
sibilitate transeundum ease ad actum hinc, etsi nihil ultra 
determinetur, consequens est, existere quantum plurimum potest 
pro temporis looique (seu ordinis possibilis existendi) capa-
ci tale, prorsus quemadmodum ita com.penuntur tessellae ut in 
proposita area quam plurimae capianturJ• ~·• VII, pp. 30,-04. 
10cr. :Paul Schrecker, "Leibniz and the Timaeus,,, R!B•w or 
Motaphzsies, IV (June, 1951), 495-505. Therein, 1\iul Sc eo~er 
notes ttie following. "Among tha thousands of philosophic 
essays, outlines, projects, and other minor papers left by 
Leibniz there is one which shows with particular clarity his 
Platonic inspiration. This essay may even be considered, I 
think, as an attempt toward the actualization ot his desidera-
tum of casting into a syste~atio form at least one important 
part of the Platonic doctrine, namely, the central idea or the 
Tim.9eus, the dialogue to which Leibniz referred most frequently 
and most positively. And the understanding of this much quoted 
and much misinterpreted little work can only profit when it 
is regarded in ite relation to the Timaeus. This opusole, the 
De rerum or1g1nat1one radicali, date! November 23, 169? •••• " 
9 
which is to be filled with the maximal series of possibilities, 
(497) "Nowhere in the De rerum originatione is there any nomi-
natim reference to Plato. on,, may thiiilt tfiat Leibniz tried 
to support a certain Platonic doctrine by the proper weight 
of the argument without recourse to the authority or its 
author. The problem discussed is however clearly that which 
constitutes the most important and timeless part of the Timaeus, 
namely the relationship of intelligence and necessity, finaI 
and efficient causes, or, as Leibniz also defined the antagon-
ism, architectonic and mathematical, respectively, metaphysi-
cal principles." (498-99) "Exactly lik~ the Timaeus, the De 
rerum ori5inatione starts with postulating the existence o?""" 
an extramundane cause ot the world of becoming to avoid the 
infinite regression. Since every link in the causal chain is 
necessary only hypothetically, an agent outside the series ot 
causes, a being endowed with abaolute, that is, metaphysical 
necessity is required to account for the reality of the exist-
ing world or becoming. '!'his God, however, is not an omnipotent 
agent any more than the Platonic demiurge. The three indepen-
dent factors of reality introduced by Plato ~ the eternal pat-
tern, the receptacle, and the demiurge - are adopted by Leib-
niz, although di.vested or their mythological garb and rational-
ized into pure logico-metaphysical constructs. 0 (499) "Firstly, 
the pattern or forms. For Leibniz, they have taken on the 
character of eternal or necessary truths, also called truths 
of reason, and elsewhere identified with easAnoes, possibles, 
or real definitions."(499) "There seems to be ••• an important 
difference between Plato's pattern and Leibniz's eternal 
essences. The latter, ••• are not merAly unohangin~ forms but 
dynamic agents. Every essence or possible reality, according 
to Leibniz, tends toward existence, and the force of this cona-
tion is proportional to the quantity of reality or perfection 
involved in the essence.20 "{500) "The second factor of reality, 
the Platonic Receptacle, is identified. by Leibniz with time 
and space which together he terms the rece~tivitas vel caRaei-
tas mundi and which he considers as the or er of possible ex!s-
tenoe. I need not elaborate on the opposition to Plato inso-
far as time is concerned, which may be accounted for histori-
cally by the rise of mathematical dynamics, •••• May it suffice 
to remark that Leibniz like Plato realized that the eternal 
essences alone cannot account for the reality of the phenomenal 
world of becoming. For Leibniz, however, space and time belong 
to the intelligible realm rather than to tha.t apprehended by 
'bastard reasoning'(52B)."(501) "The third factor is God ful-
filling the function of the Platonic demiu.rge. But once this 
demiurge is entirely demythologized and the other factors 
rationalized, what function remains to him? The essences or 
possibles vie among themselves for existence - logically, of 
course, not in a process in time - and this process of compe-
tition leads necessarily toward the actualization of the maxi-
mum of reality or perfection. God being himself conceived as 
10 
! should like to pose the following question.a, which questions 
unfortunately will remain unanswered: 
(l) Is time, as a receptacle, logically prior to the 
maximal series ot possibilities actualized? 
(2) It time is logically prior to the actualization ot 
the maximal series, does this mean that it is, 
somehow, temporarily prior? 
(3) w'hat is the relationship between God and time, that 
is, does time have the same ontological statue as God? 
(4) \.Jhat is the origin ot the raeeptacl~? 
perfect - or, in the Platonic sense, good - cannot but ratify 
the outcome ot this rational calculus of maxima, by adding to 
that possible world or combination of :possibles whose 1>ar-
tection outweighs that or the others the unintelligible quality 
of actuality. He is like an ideal chess player for whom the 
best move would have been calculated infallibly and who could 
not but perform it on the ohess board. The rules of chess 
may stnnd, ••• tor the eternal truths which are independent ot 
the will of the chess player: he oan only make tho best use 
ot them.tf{50l) 
ClfAPTEU r.;o 
'l'he previous chapter considered Leibniz's Platonic con-
ception ot tiue. This chapter will consider Leibniz's rela-
tional conception ot time. To elucidate this conception or 
time, three things are done in this chapter. namely: 
(l) that or attempting to present the relational view 
o! time that is propounded by Leibniz in the Leibniz-
Olark Oorreepondence, 
(2) that of attempting to present Iaaao Mewton's absolute 
conception ot time as it is found in hia Philosophiae 
Nat'1%'a.111 Pr&ncipia Mathematica, 
(3) that ot attempting to state points of conparison 
between Leibn.is and Newton, with regard to their 
conceptions or time. 
Points two and three are treated in this chapter us subsections 
of the chapter. This is to say that, subsection i considers 
Isaac Newton's absolute conception of time and subsection ii 
considers points or comparison between Leibniz and Newton. 
Let us now turn to the task ot stating the relational 
View of time that is propounded b;y Leibniz in the k!ibniz-
Clark Correspg!Y41aoe. 
It is Leibntz•s view that time (as well as space) is not 
anything absolute, that is, time is not anything beyond certain 
11 
12 
O!"ders of things. As Leibniz hi~selt" otatoa, 11 ••• the ::1y;iothe-
sis ~hat space and time are anything abaolut!J 1 is contradic-
tory, that is, 'tis an impossible tiction. 1111 To facilitate 
explication of Leibniz's notion of' time as relational, it 
seems necessary to turn to a diseusaion concerning the single 
rnonad., with consideration or "intra-monadic time 1' as well as 
"inter-monadic tiae."12 
The monad.13 is a simple substnnce (that is, t~e monad is 
without parts) which enters into composites. ~Now where there 
are no parts, neither extension, nor figure, nor divisibility 
11
" ••• 16. Mais cela n•estant point, l'hypothese est con-
tradictoire, c'est a dire, c•est une fiction impossible." 
Gerhardt, PhitQSOih1gqhe SCbritt9n, VII, P• 3?4. 
12ot. Nicholas Reacher, The PhilosoRSt of T.1eibniz (New 
Jersey: l?rentioe-Hall, 1967), "''pp. 58-t;;, were!n tliis dis-
tinction ot "intra-monadic time" and "inter-mona{iic time" occurs. 
l3ct. Gerhardt, Philgsoehische Gchritten, VI, 609-610. 
Therein it 1s noted t6a i 1! . on pourroi~ !onner le nom 
d I Entelechies a toutee lea substances si.mples OU Monades croees, 
car elles ont en elles une certaine perfection (£~ouoL ~o 
[vr€A{s ), 11 y a une suttisance (ocB1oc 1 p~cLc:c. ) qui les rend 
sources de leur actions internes et pour a1na1 dire des Auto-
mates incorporels." 
14cr. J. E. Erdmann. ed., Gottfried era 
PhiloeoRbica, I (Meisenheim: Jo en a ·a en, • 
'!liereln It ls noted by Leibniz tha.t: " ••• 11. Mais lea atomtJs 
de matiere eont oontra1rea a la raison: outre qu'ile aont 
encore composes de parties; puiaque l'attachement invincible 
d'une partie a l'autre, (quant on le pourroit concevoir OU 
supposer aveo raison) ne ditruiroit point leur diveraiti. Il 
n'y a que lee atomes de aubetance, o•eat-i-d1re, les unites 
reellea at abaolument deatituies de parties, qui aoient les 
souroes dee actions, et les premiers principea absolus de la 
composition des choses, et comme les derniers ilimens de 
l'analyse dee substances. On lea pourroit appeler points 
metaphysiques: ila ont quelque chose de vital et une espeoe 
de perception, et lea points mathimat1quee sont leur point 
de vile, pour exprimer i•univers. 
13 
is possible, ••• these monads are the true atoms of nature, and, 
••• the elements of all things. 1115 And, " ••• the monads can 
only begin or end all at once, ••• they can only begin by crea-
tion and end by annihilation •••• 1116 
Ea.ch monad is different from the other by the smallest 
amount of internal difference, that is, each monad's complete 
individual notion differs from any other monad by the smallest 
amount of internal difterence. 17 
According to Leibniz: 
7. There is ••• no way of explaining how a monad 
can be altered or changed in its inner being by any 
other creature, for nothing can be transposed within 
it, nor can there be conceived in it any internal 
movement which can be excited, directed, augmented 
or diminished within it, as can be done in composites, 
where there is change among the parts. The monads 
have no windows through which anything can enter or 
depart. The aocidents cannot detach themselves nor 
go about outside or eubstances •••• Thus neither substance 
1511 3. Or la, oil il n'y a point de parties, 11 n'y a ny 
etendue, ny figure, ny divisibilite possible. Et ces Monades 
sont les veritables Atomes de la Nature, et en un mot les 
Elemens des ehosee.n Gerhardt, Philosophische Schriften, VI, 
p. 60?. 
16116. Ainsi on peut dire, que lea Mona.des ne sauroient 
commencer ny finir que tout d'un coup, c'est a dire elles ne 
sauroient commencer que par creation, et finir que par anni-
hilation, au lieu, que ce qui est compose, commence ou finit 
par parties." Ibid. 
Cf. Erdmann;-?, pp. 125-26. Therein Leibniz notes that: 
" ••• 7. Et puisqu'ainsi 11 n'y a point de premiere naissanee 
ni de generation ent1erement nouvelle de l'animal, 11 s'ensuit 
qu'il n'y en aura point d'extinction finale, ni de mort 
entiere prise a la rigueur metaphysique; et que par consequent 
au lieu de la transmigration des ames, 11 n'y a qu'une trans-
formation d'un meme animal, selon que lee organes sont plies 
d1f!6remment, et plus ou moins developes." 
l?The principle or the Identity of Indiscernibles is 
central to the Leibnizian metaphysics. 
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nor accident can enter a monad from outaide. 18 
'l!he monad is completely determined (that 1s, •programmed') 
in respect to ite internal constitution, as well as to the 
maximum ot pertection that is attainable by it. \.Jbatever 
happens internally to the being of the monad, in addition to 
the "t1me"19 at which the eh an, .·e is to occur, is determined. 
As the individual monad un!olds (changes), it develops through 
"time" continuously.20 In point of fact, 
18
"?. Il n•y a pas moyen aussi d'expliquer, comment une 
Monade pu1sse etre alterie OU ohang6e dans son 1nterieur par 
quelque autre creature, puiaqu'on n•y sauroit rien transposer 
fl'3 concevoir en elle aucun mouvement interne, qui puisse etre 
excite, d1r1gi, aug11enti ou 41111nui la dedans, com.me oela se 
peut dana les compoaia, ou 11 y a de changement entre les par-
ties. Les Monades n'ont point de tenetree, par leaquellea 
qu•lque chose y puiase entree ou sortir. Les aocidens ne 
souroient se detacher, 'fl:1 se promener hors des substances, 
oomme faieoient autrea toi• lea especes sensibles dea Soholas-
tiquea. Ainsi ny subatanoe ny accident peut entrer de deb.ors 
dans une Monade.u Gerhardt, Phi!osoRh!sohe Sc~iften, VI, pp. 
60?-08. 
Of. f.;rdmann, I, p. 12?. The following is to be noted.: 
0 
••• 1:3. Il est bien vra1 qu'il n•y a point d•intluence ri'ele 
d'une substance criie aur l'autre, en parlant aelon la regueur 
aetaphyeique, et que toutea les choses, avec toutes leura rial-
itis, aont oontinuellement produites par la vertu de Dieu; ••• " 
Ot. Ie!sl• The following is to be noted: "14. Etant done 
oblige d'acoorder qu'il n•est pas possible que l'ame ou quelque 
autre veritable substance pu.isae reoevoir quelque chose par 
dihors, si ce n'est par la toute - puiasance divine, ••• " 
Ot. f¥11• The following should be noted also: " ••• 14. 
C'eat qu• aut done dire que Dieu a crie d'abord l'ame, ou 
toute autre unit6 rielle, en sorte que tout lui naisse de son 
propre fonds, par une partaite spontaneite a l'egard. d•elle-
mime, et pourtant aveo une parfaite conformiti aux choses de 
dehora." 
l9The finding ot "time" at the monadic level, will be 
seriously brought into question, as this section progresses. 
Thus, quotation marks occur around the word ''time." The dif-
ferentiation between "intra-monadic time'' and "inter-monadic 
time"' would, therefore, tall into question. Perhaps the dis-
tinction would be better rendered thus, "intra-monadic change 
ot state" and "inter-monadic change of state." 
20cr. Gerhardt, Philoso~hische Schriften, VI, p. 608. 
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••• 12. • •• There must be an individuating detail or 
chagfes, which forms ••• the specification ... anCI variety 
ol a mple substances. This detail must involve a 
multitude in the unity or in that which is simple • 
••• 13. Since every natural change takes place by 
degrees, something changes and something remains, 
there must be in the simple substance a plurality ot 
attections and ot relations, although it has no 
parta.21 
In particular the following ought to be noted: "10. Je prends 
aussi pour aecorde, que tout etre cree est sujet au changement, 
et par consequent la Monade creie auasi, et mime que ce 
changement est continue! dans ehacune." and "11. Il s'ensuit 
de ca que nous venone de dire, que les ohangemens naturels des 
Monades viennent d'un prinoipi interne, puisqu•une cause externe 
ne sauroit influer dans son interier•). 0 
ot. Ibid., VII, P• 300. Tb.ere it is noted that: ''In cuau-
lum etiam-pufohritudin1s pertectionisque universalis operum 
diVinorwa, progreeaua quidam perpetuus liberriaus totiua Uni-
versi est agnoscendus, ita ut ad m.ajorem semper cultum procedat. Quemadmodum nunc magna pars terrae nostrea oultura.m recepit 
et recipiet magnie aagieque. Et licet verum sit, interdum 
quaedam ruraua ailveaoere aut rursus destrui deprimique, hoc 
tamen ita aacipiendWI est, ut paulo ante afflictionem inter-
pretati sum.us, nempe hano ipsam destructionem depressionemque 
prodesse ad consequendum aliquid majus, 1ta ut ipso quodammodo 
damno luoremur. Et quod obJici posset: ita oportere ut Mundus 
dudum tactue fuerit Paradiaus, responeio praesto est: ets1 
multae jam substant1ae-ad magnam perfectionem pervenerint, ob 
divisibilitatem tamen continui in infinitum, semper in abysso 
rerum auperesse partea aop1tae adhuc excitandas et ad majus 
meliusque et ut verbo dicam, ad meliorem cultum provehendas. 
Nee proinde unquam ad Terminum progressus perveniri. tt 
21
"12. Maia 11 faut ausei, qu•outre le principle du 
changement 11 y ait un detail de oe qui change, qui tasee 
pour ainsi dire la npec1t1cat1on et la varieti des substances 
simples. 13. Oe detail doit envelopper une multitude dan.s 
l'uniti ou dane le simple. Car tout changement naturel ae 
taisant par degree, quelque chose change, •~ quelque chose 
reste; et par consequent 11 taut que dana la substance simple 
11 y ait une pluralite d'attections et de rapports quoyqu'il 
n•y en ait de parties ... Ibid., VI, P• 608. 
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The enduring throughout "time" sum~;ests th~it the monad has a 
past, present and tuture. With regard to the phJ'sical con-
tinuity in Nature, Leibniz stat~~: 
To my mind everything is interconnected in the uni-
verse by virtue ot metaphysical reason$ so that the 
r s nt is alwa s re ant with th future, and no 
g ven s a e s exp ca e na ura y w t1out reference 
to its 1mmediatel7 preceding state. It this be denied, 
the world will have hiatuses which would upset the 
Principle of Sufficient Heason and wil.!. compel recourse 
to miracles or to pure chance in the explanation of 
phenomena..22 
At eaoh stage of its development, the monad perceives the 
other developing monads or mirrors the other monads (that is, 
the entire universe). The correspondence, resultant from the 
mutual perceptions (or the mutual mirroring}, is the result 
ot the divinely ordained pre-established harmony. ttThe pass-
ing state, which involves and represents a multitude in unity 
or in the simple substance, is ••• I_?erqept1on"23 which ia to be 
distinguished from apperoeption (or oonsciousneas). 24 "The 
action ot the internal principle which causes the change or 
22A. Buchenau and Ernst Cassirer, ed., G. w. TAib~z 
Phil9$0¥hi?chS1 wijrke, II, pp. 556-59 quoted ln i'li!tip~ener, 
e<t., J;t §n z :., eticifons, P• 185. 
23"14. L'itat passager qui enveloppe et represente une 
multitude dans l'unite ou d.ans la substance simple n•eat autre 
chose que oe qu'on appelle la Perception, qu•on doit bien dis-
tinguisher de l'apperception ou de la consoience, comme 11 
paroitra dans la suit." Gerhardt, Philoso~hiaohe Schritten, 
VI, P• 606. 
24
ct. Ibid., VI,J• 609. Therein Leibniz states: " ••• 4. 
Ainei il es't'DOn de f re distinction, entre la Perception qui 
est l'etat interieur de la Monade repriaentant les choses 
externes, et L'Appercept1on qui est la Conscienoe, ou la con-
noiseance reflexive de oet •tat intirieur, laquelle n•est 
point donnee a toutes lea UU!tSt ni toujours a la rname ame." 
l? 
passage from one perception to another ma.y be called appeti-
tion. 025 Continuity is present, thus, in the tact that ea.ch 
monad always mirrors the other monads around it, that is 
11 
••• every substance expresses the whole sequence of the uni-
verse 1n accordance with ita own viewpoint or relationahip 
to the rest, so that all are in perfect correspondence to 
one another ... 26 
And finally, continuity is suggested b7 tho tact that 
all "places" o! the universe are occupied by monads, which 
monads mirror the universe from their particular 11place," with 
different degrees ot clarity so that all possible degreea of 
clarity are accounted tor. The monads are always perceiving, 
even it it is but the smallest amount. There are no leaps in 
a particular monad's perception. "The perceptions or expres-
sions or external things occur in the soul at a f ixad moment 
by virtue ot its own lava, as in a world apart and as it there 
existed nothing but God and itself' •••• 027 And " ••• the series 
ot representations produced in the soul will correspond natur-
ally to the series ot changes in the Universe 1tselt: •••• n28 
25n15. L'action du pr1ncipe interne, qui tait le change-
ment OU le passage d'une perception a une autre, peut etre 
appelli Appetition; •••• " ~· 
26
"C'est a dire chaque substance exprime toute la suite 
de l'univers selon la v\le ou rapport qui l~ est propre, d•oii 
11 arrive qu'elles s•accordent parfaitement; •••• " Ibid., II, 
p. 4?. -
27° ••• 14 •••• Et les perceptions ou expreasiona des choses 
extern.ea arrivant a l'ame a point nomme, en vertu de ses propres 
loix, comme dans le monde a part, et comne s'il n'existoit 
rient que Dieu et ell••••••" Erdmann, I, p. 12?. 
28
" ••• 15. Et cette nature de l'mne eta.nt representative 
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As Leibniz etatesi 
15. This tq'pothea1s is indeed possible. For 
wh;y could not God firet give to substance a nature or 
internal force which could produce in it, in an 
orderly wa;y, eveJ.?"thing which will happen to it (as 
in a spiritual or formal automaton but treo in that 
it has a shnre ot reason), that is, all the appear-
ances or e:xpre•a1ona it will have, and that, without 
the aid of &111' creature? All the more so sino~ the 
nature of substance requires nacesaarily and oonoeals 
a progression or chang1....without which it would not 
have the !orce to aot.~ 
It is evident troa the discussion 'to t~ia point, that 
there is a pre-established harmony within the mon.ad itaelt • 
as well as a pre-eatabliehed harmony among tb.e monads in the 
universe. This baraoq is by no means oausal, that is: 
••• !Very individual aubatanoe is eelt-oomplete and 
its development in time is fixed. No causal rela-
tions can arise among monads; at beat ihey CL, 
aggg~d with one another in their state•• This reci-
procal ff 90Ji extend a !!p·ogb9uj the uni verse and 
links a o its monads !n one vast !rwaewo~k ot 
mutual interrelation.'O 
This aooord is eetablished anterior to the creation ot the 
de l'Univers d'une manii:ve tres-exacte, quo1que plus ou aoins 
diatinote, la suite des representations que l'ame ae produJ.t, 
repondra natur·ellement a la au1te des cban,eaen• de l 'Univer• 
mimes comme en 1ichange le corps a auss1 ite aooommod.e a l'aae, 
pour lea rencontree ou elle est concue comme agiasante au 
dehors; oe qui est d'autant plus raisonnable, que les corps 
ne aont !ai~s que pour le& esprits ••~le capablea d'entrer en 
aociete avec Dieu, et de oelebrer ea gloire." lBiA·• I, p. 128. 
29q15. Cette hypothese est tris-poseible. Car pourquoi 
Dieu ne pourroit-11 pas donner d.'abord a la eubetance une nature 
ou force interne qui lui put produire par o.rctre, (cmnme dans 
un automate spirituel ou f'ormel, ma.is libre en celle qui a la 
raison en partage) tout ce qui lui arrivera, c•eat-a-dire, 
toutea lea apparGAcea ou expressions quelle aura, et cela sans 
le 8800\U'S d•aucune creature? D'autant plua que la nature de 
la substance demande nicesaaireaent et envelope essentiellement 
un progress ou un changement, sans lequel elle n'auroit point 
de toroe 4'e.g1r." .l!?li•• I, pp. 12?-28. 
'° 
Nicholas Reseher, Oi• o~t., P• 55. 
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actual world. The accord at any instant "ot time" is but th.e 
consoquenco of the accord at any previous instant. These 
interconnections are ot an 1ntim3te linkage that continues 
operative in infinite deta1131 through the course ot 0 hiator1-
cal development" ot the univerae.32 
Let us pause, and sWUtarize briefly the points established 
thus tar,33 in tb1• eection, regarding "time": 
(1) It seems evident that time has not been considered 
as a pre-existing receptacle (as it wae, in section 
one) that exists somehow independently of analogic-
ally prior to the existence or the nubstances that 
are to be placed in it, but rather "time" has been 
considered aa somehow "derived" from the monads. 
(2) There seeaa to be a "dual nature"' to "time," that 
is, 'here is a "private-monadic timen (or ''intra-
31.A.. Buchenau and. Ernst Oassirer, ed •• if w. Le&bnie Ph!-lo-ao~bil!hea Werk!t II, PP• 556-59 quoted in PK llp Oiener, &!., 
U1finli getectlons, P• 181. Therein Leibniz states the follow-
ing: "Now the Law of Continuity demands that hen the essen al 
det ina ion ot n b a roxima e hose o ano er as a 
es o ormer s o a so a u-
a ~. ence s neos3sary ~--alf!-a~.ffi~~.~o~r~· ~.~r~s~o .... ~na~~u~ra~~.~n~g form but a single chain 
in which different kinda like so many links clasp one another 
so tirml7 that it is impossible for th~ aenae and the imagina-
tion to fix the exact point where one begins or the other ends1" 
Gt., Erdmann, I, P• 118. Therein Leibniz states the fol-
lowing: "Je suis tellement pour l'intini ac"1el, qu•au lieu 
d'admettre que la nature l'abhorre, cone l'on dit vulgairement, je tiene qu'elle l'atfecte par-tout, pour mi.aux marquer lea 
perfections de eon Auteur. Ainai je croia qu•11 n•y a aucune 
partie de la matiire qui ne eoit, je ne dis pas divisible, mais 
aotuelleaent diviaee; et par consequent la mo1n4re particello 
doit etre conaideree oomme un monde ple1n 4'une 1ntinit' de 
creatures ditterentea." 
32Adm1ttedly this last phrase is an interpretation, though 
very problemmatioal, but juatified given footnotes 20 and 22. 
33And in particular, those points which are most relevant 
to the rest ot this section. 
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monadic time'') and a 11public-monadie time'' (or 
ttinter-monudic timei') as the monads .in toto, given 
their interrelatedne:::rn, change together. 
(3) Continuity is presant throughout the change ot 
states of each monad. 
Oontinuity is present, given the tu.ct that an ever 
developing monad mirrors the other developint~ monads, 
and each of them mirror it. 
(4) "The monads begin all at onca and end all at once.'' 
Let us now continue, with hopes of' stating the precise 
sense, of wnat it means to sa~ that time is relational, on 
Leibniz's view. 
It is my opinion that Leibniz rola·tes a "state'• ot a. par-
ticular monad, to an "'inatant. it 'l'his is evidenced !"rom the 
following qu.otationas 
1128. I don't say that two poillts ot apace. a:ce 
one and the aame poil'lt, nor that two instants o:f time 
are one and the same instant, •••• "4 
••• 6. 'l'hat inatuta, consider 1 d without the things. 
are nothing at all1 and that they conaist onl;r in the 
successive order ot things: which order remaining the 
same, one of the two states, viz. that ot a supposed 
anticipation, would not at all differ, cor could be 
discerned. trom, the other which now ia.'' 
'4•2e. Je ne dia pas que deux points de 1'1?.apaoe sont 
un meme point, n7 que deux Instans du temps aont us mime In-
stant, •••• " Gerhardt, ;FP!lO§ORhische SChr~tt9n, VII, p. '95. 
35" ••• 6 •••• Les instans bore des choses ne sont rien, et 
qu'ila ne conetiatent que dans leur ordre succeas1t, lequel 
deaeura.nt le mime, l'un des deux etats. comme oelU7 de l'anti-
cipation 1maginee, ne diftereroit en rien. et ne sauroit etre 
diacerne de l 'autre que est maintenant. •• ru.d._, VII• p. 364. 
Leibniz 18 talking about things and It-rs not directly 
inferable from the text, whether by ~thing•" he means "monads" 
or (Leibnizian) "phenomena." 
\Jhat is to be concluded? Perhaps, the following: 
(l) Instants cannot exist apart from things. 
(2) To each instant corresponds a different "thing-
state." 
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(3) There is a successive order of different instants 
and of the corresponding "states ot a thing. 0 36 
(4) Is Leibniz suggesting, aomehow, that "time consists 
ot instanta 0 ?3? 
With regard to tillle, Leibniz states something which at 
first sight seems quite curious, that is: 
49. It cannot be said that [a certain] duration 
is eternal but [it can be saidJ that the things which 
continue alwaye are eternal, f gaining always a new 
durationJ Whatever exists of time and of duration, 
[being successive] perishes continually: an<l how can 
a thing exist eternally, which (to speak exactl7) 
does never exist at all? For, how can a thing exist, 
whereof no part does ever exist? Nothing or time does 
ever exist, but instants; and an instant is not even 
itself a part of time. Whoever considers these obser-
vations, will easily apprehend that time oan only be 
an ideal thing. And the analogy between time and 
apace, will easily make it appear, that the one is 
as merely ideal as the other. [But, if in saying 
that the duration of_, a thing is eternal, it is only 
meant that the thi!lS_tndures eternally, r have nothing 
to say against it.] "'6 
36zt seems to me, that (l) through (3) are reminiscent 
or the earlier mentioned distinction between "intra-monadic 
states*' and u1nter-monadio states." 
37The question posed in (4), as it atands related to the 
first quote preceding this particular discussion, will be con-
sidered shortl7. 
'8n49. On me peut point dire qu'une certaine durie est 
eternelle; mais on peut dire que les choses qui durent tous-jours, sont eternelles, en gagnant tousjours une duree nouvelle. 
Tout oe qui existe dutempa et de la duration, etant sucoessit, 
perit continuellement. Et comment une chose pourroit elle 
existor eternellement, qui ~ parler exaotement n'existe jamais? 
Car comment pourroit exister une chose, dont jamaia aucune 
One migbt interpret this passage, as follows: 
( l) Let "things'' refer to "monads. " 
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(2) In the meta.ph7sioal sense, there is no "death'' or 
destruction .. or monads but rather their transtor-
aation, from state to state.39 
(3) A monad is continuously changing states and at no 
two instants, is the state of the monad the aame. 40 
(4) Since a monad is forever changing states, it is not 
the case that the monad remains the same (that a 
particular state or the monad remains the same), 
hence the monad is not eternal in this sense.41 
(5) A monad, since it is a real unity, has no parts, 
so it ia not the case that a particular part of 
the monad lasts eternally.42 
(6) "Nothing ot time does ever exist, but instants; 
and an instant is not oven itself a part of time." 
(?) Time is an ideal thing. 
Let us, first ot all, consider (l) through (5). In order to 
partie n'existe? Du temps n•existent jamais que des instans, 
et l'instant n'eat pas mime une partie du temps. Quioonque 
oonsiderera ces observations, com.prehendra bien qua le temps 
ne aauroit etre qu une chose ideale. Et l'Analogie du temps 
et de l'espaoe tera bein juger, que l'un eat auss1 ideal que 
l'autre. Oependant si en disant que la duration d'une chose 
est eternelle, on entend. seulement que la chose dure eternel-
lement, ~· n'1q r1en 4 "3 red.ire." Gerhardt, ?hiloooRhiache 
Schritt•n 1 VII, PP• 402-03. 
39cr. 1upra, n. 16, P• 13. 
40cr. i'u2ra, n. '4t P• 20. 
4lot. 1uizra, n. 35. P• 20. 
42cr. gu~ra, n. 14, p. 12. 
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facilitate this task, a digression seems necessary. To the 
problem under consideration, Nicholas Hesoher makes the fC>l-
lowing related observation, regarding :reibniz's concept or 
time, viz., 
'l'be Non-Homogene1tt of Time. There ie a total lack 
ol nomogene!ty !nlme, according to Leibniz. He 
holds that it is not only impossible that the state 
ot the universe is the same at two different instants 
but even that every earlier state of the universe has 
a logical, or natural priority over every later state. 
Preoisely what it is that Leibniz has in mind one can 
only conjecture. I ahoul(l suggest that this priority 
is a consequence or continuity considerations. An 
earlier instant cannot be interchanged with a later 
one because this vould involve a break in the conti-
nuity of the development of the universe.43 
At this point in the disouaaion, we seer. to have "misplaced" 
the "notion" of continuity that is present throughout a 
monad's changes. We tind ourselves lert with a particular 
monadic-state in an "instant" and a prior or posterior monadic-
state in its "instant." This is slightly inaccurate, tor as 
Leibniz himself states: 
'When one or two non-contemporaneous elements contains 
the grounds tor the other, the former is regarded as 
the inttcedent, and the latter as the oon9eguant. My 
earl er state or existence contains the groun for 
the existence o! the latter. And since, because or 
the connection of all things, the earlier state in 
me contains also the earlier atate of the other thing, 
it also contains the ground ot the later state of the 
other thing, and is therefore prior to it. All exist-
ing elements ma7 be thus ordered either b7 relation 
ot cgntemporaneity (co-ef!stence) or by that of being 
before or after Iii t1m!• 
43N1cholas Rescher, 2i• c1t., P• 101. 
44c. I. Gerhardt, ed., Die matbematische 3chr1ften von 
G. w. L&ibniz, Vol. VI! (Ber!In, 1S49-&'' PP• i1-~A quote! in ~I1Ipiener, ed., Le1bgtz Selec~ione (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1951) pp. 2b!-6~. 
24 
Although Leibniz is here talking of "elements," and in parti-
cular ot one element containing the grounds tor the other 
element, what he does say seems to shed additional light upon 
the interconnectedness ot monads. \.Jbat appears to be indi-
cated is that the interconnectedness of the monads is more 
complex than was preV1.ously realized. The complexity rests 
in the factor of an earlier state ot a particular monad con-
taining the ground tor the existence of the later state, as 
well ae the earlier state ot an other monad and the ground 
ot the later state of that other monad. 
Let us now return to (6) through (?) and the following 
statement of Leibniz, namely: 
••• 49. Nothing o! time does ever exist, but in-
stants; and an 1natant is not even itself a part 
ot time. Whoever considers these observations, 
will easily apprehend that time can only be an 
ideal thing.45 
and attempt to clarity it. It seems to me, that Herbert wildon 
Carr provides the key, with his observation that: 
Space and time in Leibniz's system have their Sutti-
cient Reason in the real world, but they belong to 
the representative world, the mirrored universe which 
exists for each monad in its perceptions. They are 
therefore ideal, not real in thernsel ves; they belong 
to the world or appearances nnd not to the nowaenal 
reality. Yet space and time are not themselves 
appearances, nor are they objects or perception, 
they belong to tbe order of perceptione.46 
45 ••••• 49. Du temps n' existent jamais que des instans, 
et l'instant n•est pas mime une partie du temps. Quiconque 
cons1derera ces observations, comprehendra bien que le temps 
?_?& sauroit etre qu'une chose ideale." Gerhardt, PJ:ilosoJ?hif!Ch~ 
~britten, VII, PP• 402·0,. 
46tterbert Wildon Carr, Leibniz (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 
1929) p. 153. 
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;Jhat is being sugg·ested in this discussion, and now coming 
forth, is that for Leibniz the ultimate conatitutents (the 
monads) ot the universe are not material, not extended, are 
not in time and space, and cannot move. Given our ever7day 
experiences, we do, in tact, encounter coving Lmateriai) ob-
jects which move through time and apace. 80, let us pose 
this question--in what sense do time and apace belong to the 
phenomenal realm? The answering of this question concerns 
not only the relationship between "phenomena" and monads, but 
also the applicability ot the terminology ot ":phenomena'' to 
monads. In regard to the problem of terminology, Ruth Lydia 
Saw observes that: 
Matter and motion, apace and time are tor Leibniz 
iSfnomena bone 'fGdata, that is to say, it will 
no ge sul£a5!e o use these terms or any o~ their derivatives when we are speaking of monads.47 
Yet there are true statements to be made about 
the monads which are connected with spatial-
teaporal statements to be made about the world 
or appearances •••• 48 
Relatedly, Nicholas Reacher offers an insight into the rela-
tionship between "phenomena" and monads, in :regard to "time," 
through bis statement that: 
Time (as well as space) 1s ultimately grounded in 
tbe change of states of monads (and in all the 
monads) and the appetition or the monads (the 
!;c;~;wo~n!h~t~~~a:o:!~!of!nfhef~~~v!!:e)~~9po1nt 
47Ruth Lydia Saw, L!ibnia (Londons Penguin Books, 1959) 
p. 100. 
48Ib!d., p. 101. 
49Nicholas Rescher, OQ• cit., P• 9?. 
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.£i~t is becoming apparent is that change is the essence of 
the monads and the problem has been one of talking about 
change without time. Leibniz attempts to account tor our 
everyday world (the phenomenal world) in terms or an ultimate 
constitutent (the monad). Time results from (or ia derivative 
trom) the properties ot the monad.50 Time concerns the phe-
nomenal order, and more specifically, the relations between 
objects (material ob;Jecta), be the relations either contem-
poraneous or non-contemporaneous. 
One can speak of the measurability of time and of dura-
tion51 but this is in regard to the uphenomenal renlm" and to 
the objects therein. Concerning the measurabilit~ of tine, 
Nicholas Reacher observes that: 
The amount ot time between two moments ia an exact 
measure or the number of states of the universe 
intermediate between them. Into a given amount ot 
time only a certain tixed number of distinct states 
ot the universe can be put, neither more nor leas. 
'?he amount ot time is an exact measure of temporal 
order, and this can be alter$d by adding or dropping 
50or cou.rse one is faced with the problem ot 'well-round-
ing. • In this regard see Nicholas Reacher, 91· cit., p. 81. 
Therein he states: "Ia it the case that the o Jeots with which 
one deals in the aoiencea and the phenomena which confront one 
in everyday lite result trom properties of the monads that 
constitute larger-scale-aggregates?" 
51ot. Gerhardt, ~hi~osop~aohe Schriften, VII, p. 415. 
Therein Leibniz states& ?oowing: '"· .".J:D5. Je reponds 
que cela n•est point: car si le temps est plus grand, il y 
aura plus d'etats successits pareils interposes; et s'il est 
plus petit, 11 y en aura moins, puiaqu'il n'7 a point de 
vuide ni de condensation ou de penetration, pour ainai dire, 
dans lea temps, non plus que dana lea lieux.'' 
It is to be noted that the problem 0£ the m.eaaurability 
ot time, in terms or duration and the continuum, will be con-
sidered in greater depth in section three. 
some states which, with the actual state ot 
attairs, is impossible.52 
2? 
Leibniz does speak of ideal or mathematical time, according 
to Nicholas Reacher, "giving it as an example of a continuum 
where the parts may be assumed in any way, and which is con-
sequently not real, but ftideal. 11 53 Thia may be, perhaps, 
exemplitied by Leibniz's statement that: 
The ~ ot !!!! or ~lJ!QJt, considered in themselve1 
are I<riiI tninga; and-aiiretore perfectly resemble 
one another, like two agetract unite. But it is not 
eo with two ctfcrete .2n!.!• or w!tS two real ~1mes or 
two 1paees rI ea -ii•~t is truely actual.54 
Let us now consider first, Newton's conception o! time, 
second, Newton's conception or time as absolute in relation 
to Leibniz's conception of time as relational, and third, 
l•ibniz and Newton 1n relation to Kant. 
i). Kewton•s conceit&on ot tim~. 
The philosophic position of Isaac Newton was that of 
ecient1t1c materialism. In this regard, Herbert wildon Carr 
makes tbe observation that: 
Distrustful of metaphysics, and confining bia-
aelf to eoientitic methods of observation and experi-
ment, Newton found himself led to postulate space 
and time as absolute uniformities. Thie was in 
52N1cholas Reacher, 2R• cit., p. 9?. 
531b14. 
54"2?. Les parties du temps ou du lieu, prises en elles 
memee, sont des choses idealee; ainsi elles se reaeemblent 
partaitement, comme deux unites abstraitea. Mais 11 n'en est 
pas de mime de deux Una concrets, ou de deux temps efteotits, 
ou de deux espaces remplia, c•est a dire, veritablement actuels.u 
Gerhardt, Ph!loao<hiscb! 8cbr1ften, VII, p. 395. 
! 
I' 
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etfact to attirm scientific materialiam •••• 1'he direct 
effect of this empirical principle appeared to be to 
establish the reality of material corporeal existence 
as the basis ot all knowledge. Mind could be con-
ceived as an impressible corporeal organ, Nature as 
a boundless expanse or im~obile extension, within 
which masses ot matter, possessing the peculiar 
force, attraction, aove with varying velocities sub-ject to mechanical laws.55 
Newton's theory of time is presented in a "Scholium to 
Definition VIII" of the Ph!loso,Qp1at ~a~alis Pri9Ci;Ria Mathe-
matica. In the Scholium, Newton diatinguiahea between absolute 
and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and common time. 
Let us look at tour passages in the "~'lcholiwa to Detini tion 
VIII," namely: 
I. Absolute, true, and mathematical time, ot 
itself, and from ita own nature, flows equabl7 without 
relation to anything external, and by another name is 
called duration: relative, apparent, and common time, 
is some sensible and external (whether accurate or 
unequable) measure ot duration by the means of motion, 
which is commonly uaed instead of true time; such as 
an hour, a day, a month, a year.56 
55aerbert wildon Oarr, 2¥5 c~., P• 155· 
ct. J. T. Frazer ed.,eoices ot;time (New York: 
George Braz1ller, 1966), p. ia. !Ee lot!o ng is noted therein: 
''Near the end ot hitt Pri,no1pfe! he stated detini tel:r, •I frame 
no hypothesis; tor whatever a not deduced from the phenomena 
is to be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphy-
sical or physical, whether ot occult qualities or mechanical, 
have no pla.ce in experimental philosophy.• There is evidence 
throughout Newton's writings that he did not adhere rigidly 
to this principle. But the deliberate introduction of absolute 
time, space and motion, which are clearly unobservable, seems 
such a flagrant violation ot the empirical spirit ot hie entire 
philosophy that it criee out tor justification. He prefaced 
the introduction ot these absolutes by admitting that he did 
not define time, space, and motion in accordance with the wa:r 
in which· they are ordinarily understood. 'The common people 
conceive these quantities under no notions but trom the relation 
they bear to sensible objects.• ••• He insisted that •1n philo-
sophical d1squ1a1t1on•• we ought to abstract rrom our senses, 
and consider things themselves, distinct from what are only 
sensible measures or them.'" 
56"1. Tempus Abaolutum, verum, & mathematicum, in se & 
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••• IV. Absolute time, in astronomy, is distinguished 
from the relative, by the equation or correction of 
the apparent time. For the natural days are truly 
unequal, though they are commenly considered as equal, 
and used for a measure ot time; astronomers correct 
this inequality that they may measure the coleatial 
motions bj a more accurate time. It mu.y be, that 
there is no such thing as an equable motion, whereby 
time may be accuratel7 measured. All motions aay be 
accelerated and retarded, but the flowing of absolute 
time is not liable to any change. The duration or 
perseverance ot the existence or things remains the 
same, whether the motions are swift or slow, or none 
at all: and therefore this duration ought to be dis-
tinguished trom what are only sensible measures thereof; 
and trom which W§ deduce it, by means of the astrono-
mical equation.57 
••• IV. As the order of the :;arts of time 1a irnmutable, 
so also is the order ot the parts of apace. Suppose 
those parts to be moved out of their places, and they 
will be moved ••• out ot themselves. For ti.mes and 
spaces are, as it were, the places as well of them-
selves as or all other things. All things are places 
in time as to order ot succession and in apace as to 
order of situation. It is from their essence or nature 
that they are places; and that the primary places ot 
things should be movable, is absurd. There a.re there-
fore the absolute places; and translations out ot those 
places, are the onl.Jr absolute motions.58 
natura aua, sine relatione ad externum quodvia, aequabiliter 
tluit, alioque nomine d1oitur Duratio: Relativum, apparens, 
i vulgare est sensib111s & externa quaevis durationis per 
motum mensura (seu accurata seu inaequabilis) qua vulgua Vice 
veri temporis utitur, ut bora, dies, memais, annus." Samuel 
Horsley, ed., I aaci New oni era ua exatant Omnia, II 
(LoDdini: Excu e at oannes , P• • 
5?q ••• IV. ~empus Abaolutum a Relativo d1atingu1tur in 
Astronomia per aequationem temporis vulgi. Inaequales enia 
sunt dies naturalee, qui vulgo tanquam aequalea pro mensura 
temporia habentur. Hano inaequalitatem corrigunt Astronomi, 
ut ex variore tempore mensurent motua ooelestes. Possible est, 
ut nullus ait motus aequabilis, quo tempue accurate mensuretur. 
Accelerari & retardar1 possunt motus omnea,aed tluxus temporis 
absoluti mutari nequit. Eadem eat duratio seu pereeverantia 
existentiae rerum, sive motua s1nt oeleree1 sive tardi, sivi 
nulli: proinde haeo a mensuris sld.s aell8ib~l1bua mer:ID diatin-l!J.itur & ex iiade colligui't\J.r per a.equatioaea astronoaioam. 1• 
lJU.4• t PP• ?-S. 
58" ••• IV. Ut ordo part1um temporis eat 1:mmutab111a, sic 
etiam ordo partium spatii. Moveantur hae de locis auia, & 
;,.Jheretore relative quantities are not the quantities 
themeelvee, whose names they bear, but those sensible 
measures ot tbem (either accurate or inaccurate), 
w'bieh are commonly used instead of the measured quan-
t1 t1ea themselvee. And it the meaning ot word.a is to 
be determined by their use, then by the names time, 
space, place and ao~ion, their sensible measures are 
properly to be understood; and the expression will be 
Wlusual, and purel7 aathematical, it the measured 
quantities themselves are meant. On this account, 
those violate the accuracy of language, which ought 
to be kept precise, who interpret these words tor 
the measured quant1t1ea. Nor do those leas detile 
the purity ot mathematical and philosophical truths, 
who confound real gy.ant1ties with their relations and 
sensible measuree.'9 
Let ua pause tor a moment, and state, as clearly as possible, 
the bas1c claims ot Newton's theory, given the above. Thus: 
(l) Newton differentiates between absolute, trt~e and 
mathematical time and relative, apparent and cot111on 
time. 
(2) Absolute, true and mathematical time flows without 
relation to anJth1ng whereas relative, apparent and 
movebuntur (u~ i'a dicaa) de seipsie. Nam tempora & spatia 
aunt sui ipsoru.m & rerum omnium quasi looa. In tempore quoad 
ord1nem aucceea1on1s, in spatio quoad ordil'lem aitue, locantur 
universa. De 1llorwn eseentia est, ut sint looa: & loca pri-
maria moveri absurdWD eat. Haec aunt igitur Absoluta Loca; & 
solae translationes de bis loaie aunt Absoluti Motus." ~·• 
P• 8. 
59" ••• IV. Quant1tatee relat1vae non aunt igitur eae ipaae 
quantitates, qua.rum nomina prae ae terunt, sed sunt ea.rum men-
aurae illa aeneibilea (verae an errantes) quibus VUlgus, loco 
quant1tatum mensuratarum, utitur. At si ox ueu definiendae 
sunt verborum signitioationes; per nomina 1lla Temporis, Spatii, 
Looi & Notus proprie intelligendae erunt hae menaurae oensi-
bile s; & sermo erit inaolena & pure matheaat1cua, ai quant1ta-
tes menauratae hie intelligantu.r. Proinde vim interunt sacris 
literis, qui voces hasoe de quantitatibua aenauratis ibi inter-
pretantur. Neque minus contaminant Mathes1n & Philosophia.m, 
qui quantita,ea veraa owa ipsarum relationibua • vulga.ribus 
mensu.ris contundunt." J:bid., p. 11. 
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common time is some sensible and external measure 
of duration by means ot motion. 
(3) Absolute time in astronomy is distinguished trom 
relative time, by the equation or oorroct1on of the 
apparent time which 1s unequal. 
(4) 'l'he duration of absolute time must be distinguished 
from the duration o! relative time because the motions 
used to measure relative time may be swif't or slow 
or none at all and the duration ot absolute time is 
not subject to change. 
( 5) The ord.er or the parts ot time is unchanged. 
(6) All things are placed in time ae to order of succes-
s1on. 
(?) One ought to be oaretul and not oontound mathematical 
measures of time with relative (sensible) measures ot 
time or vice versa. 
With this 1n view, let us continue with hopes ot clarifying 
the phrase 0 absolute, true and mathematical time,n which phrase 
seems to me to be the key to understanding the just quoted 
sections ot the Soholium. 
Newton believed. that certain dynamical phenomena require 
a distinction between absolute and relative acceleration, 
between absolute and relative motion, i.e., 
Newton believed the laws of motion presupposed the 
existence of an absolute time and space in which 
bodies could truly, rather than merely relatively, 
be said to be in motion. A body that appears to 
be in accelerated motion relative to some material 
reterence frame would only appear to be in the 
presence ot forces relative to that frame and would 
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appear to be free of forces relative to some other· 
reference frame. Although Newton admitted that, in 
general, measurements of velocity must be made rela-
tive to a material reference frame, he claimed that 
the presence of absolute motion QQuld be diatin-
guisbed from relative motion •••• 60 
Newton also believed that the existence ot absolute motion 
implies the existence ot absolute space and absolute time. 
His observation is as follows: 
••• A watertilled bucket banging by a rope is sub-jected to the following sequence ot events (1) The 
rope is twisted and then released so that the bucket 
begins to rotate; in the initial stages ot this 
rotation, the bucket is in motion relative to the 
water and the surface is flat. (2) Shortly there-
after, the water begins to rotate also, until it 
finally reaches a state in which it is at rest 
relative to the bucket; now its surface is curved. 
(3) The bucket is stopped abruptly; again the water 
is rotating relative to the bucket, as in (1), but 
this time its surface is curved. \4) finally, the 
water again comes to rest relative to the bucket, 
but unlike the situation in (2), its surtaoe is now 
tlat.61 
What is the significance of this observation, according to 
Newton? I 
Newton argued that since the surface of the water 
can be either tlat or curved regardless ot the state 
ot the bucket to which its motions are referred, 
the water's rotation cannot be made a function of 
the reference frame and so must be real, not only 
relative, and that this absolute motion implies the 
existence ot an abeolute61pace and time in which this motion takes place. 2 
According to Kaith Emerson Ballard, 
The basic claim of Newton's theory is that space 1a 
60DudleJ' Shapere "Isaac Newton," Jfdlczclo12,dia of l?hilogopnz, 
xv, p. 495. 
6l~b~,d. 
62tbisJ.. 
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logically prior to matter and has an existence i.nde-
pendent of matter, and that time is also prior to 
and exists independently ot events or processes. 
That is to say, matter could not exiet without some 
space in which to reside, nor could events or proces-
ses exist without some time in which they occur, and 
through which they endure. But space would exist, 
in exactly the same sense as it does now, even if 
there were no matter to occupy it; and time would 
exist even if there were no events or6~rocesaes to occur in it and to endure through it. ' 
Let us briefly summarize what has just been stated, that is: 
(l) Space and time are prior to matter, events and 
processes. 
(2) Space and time are not dependent upon the existence 
of matter, events and processes. 
(3) Space and time would exist in exactly the same 
fashion were there or were there not bodies. 
It is my opinion that points (1) through (3) just cited, refer 
to the existence or absolute time and apace Jm! absolute time 
and space are here viewed in a different way than preViously, 
that is, one is not now considering different relative traa.es 
or reference as opposed to an absolute frame of reference, 
with regard to certain dynamical phenomena. Points {l) through 
(3) concern the existence of absolute time and space prior to 
the existence of any world, any matter. Given the fact that 
thio world exists, that matter exists, we then talk ot absolute 
time, space, and motion anq relative time, space, and motion 
in terms of frames of reference. These "two ways" ot viewing 
absolute space and time are of aignif1oanee, beca.u~!-\d~~.~ .. 
.,,• - '·. •·l ~ ~ --·> ~ -_,. l.i4: ~ ... ':•,. .. 
63xaith Emerson Ballard, 0 Leibniz' a Tbeor;rr ~t)ti~a1l .... 8:!1~. <~ ?.,'\ 
Time, 11 J. Hist. Ideas, XXI (1960), 50. ' , ·. · "<."'"'' ··' ~ 
\ .1'•11•;co:.::n·,· I 
'\· ... , t , .... (., ;..-' ~·· /' 
••.,,; .t:; r,; .. '\ ~.,• ,• 
•1':, •. ,..,..,... __ , __ ... , .. ,.,.. 
one is enabled to differentiate, however finely, betwee·n ab-
solute time without regard to the existence of bodies and 
absolute mathematical time in terms of an absolute frame of 
reference which has regard to the existence of bodies. 
11). Soml com~arisonf between Leibniz's relational c2noeution 
o!' lme a.na lew op. s a.'6soiute conception o? time. 
'l'he points of comparison are the following: 
(1) Leibniz provided a metaphysical foundation tor pheno-
mena. 
Newton was distrusttul of metaphysics; thus he confined 
himself to the scientific methods ot experimentation 
and observation. 
(2) On Leibniz's view, time is the form of order among 
phenomena. 
On Newton's view, time can be thought of as relative, 
apparent a.nd common and/or absolute, true and mathe-
matical. 
(3) Given the existence ot the world, Newton differen-
tiates between absolute mathematical measures of time 
and sensible mathematical measures ot time, in terms 
ot frames ot reference. 
Leibniz•s view of time, being tied to the relations 
among things, would be a mathematical measure based 
upon abstraction from things (or a relative, sensible 
apparent measure). 
(4) On Leibn1$•s view it is not meaningful to raise the 
question as to what moment ot time the world was 
35 
created, for time comes into existence with the 
creation of this actual world. 
On Newton'a Vi.ow it is meaningful to raise the ques-
tion as to what moment of time the world was created, 
tor absolute time exists prior to this actual world 
with its matter, events and. processes. 
(5) Leibniz, in bis relational view ot time, denied time 
{as well as space) to be the ultimate tra.mework ot 
the universe.64 
Newton did not deny time (as well as apace) to be the 
ultimate framework ot the universe. 
64Time, resulting trom the properties ot the monads (espe-
cially change and appetition or the mirroring of one monad by 
another), concerns the "phenomenal realm, t• that is, the rela-
tions between objects. 
CHAPTER THREE 
TIME AS AN IDEALIZATION OF THI-; EXISTING 
Rn.A TIONS BET'w'EEN THINGS 
This chapter and the next will investigate turther the 
relational conception ot time. In particular, this chapter 
will consider the sense of Leibniz's position that 'time is 
but a mere idealization of the existing relations between 
things,• whereas the next chapter will consider why 'it ia 
not meanin;;~tul, on Leibniz's view, to raise the question as to 
what moment or time the world was created." 
The expressing ot the sense ot the position that 'time 
is an idealization ot the existing relations between th1nga• 
seems to involve, at the very least, two steps,65 namel7: 
(A) the explaining ot what it means to say that time is 
the form or order among phenomena, 
(B) the explaining ot how time, being tied to the rela-
tions among things, is a mathematical measure based 
upon abstraction from things (or how time is a rela-
tive, sensible, apparent measure). 
The two steps themselves rest upon a differentiation between 
(1) actual time 
(2) absolute time 
65step (A) is comparison two listed in chnpter two, sub-
section ii, p. ,4. Step (B) is oompariaon three listed in 
chapter two, subsection 11, p. 34. 
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(3) time as an idea in God's mind 
(4) mathematical time 
3? 
(5) mathematical infinite and true infinite (eternity). 
Distinctions one, two and three give us a partial explanation 
of step (A), whereas one, four and five give us an explanation 
ot step (B). 
Detore proceeding onward with discussion of steps (A) 
and (B), an observation seems in order. The observation is 
as follows. As this chapter progresses, the conoeptione ot 
time which come into increasing importance are actual time and 
mathematical time. These conceptions a.re reall7 "a conception." 
The conception appears to make sense of the position that 
'time is an idealization of the existing relations between 
things.• Thie being said, let us now turn to consideration 
ot step (A). 
(A) ot what it means to sa that time 
among R enomen~. 
As previously noted, the explanation ot what it means to 
say that time is the form of order among phenomena rests. in 
part. upon the differentiation between (1) actual-ideal time, 
(2) absolute-ideal time and (3) time as an idea in God's mind. 
The consideration ot actual-ideal time and absolute-ideal time 
involves discussion ot (a) the origin ot men's notion or actual 
space and absolute space and (b) the origin ot men•s notion 
ot actual time and absolute time. 'l'he consideration of time 
as an idea in God's mind leads to examination ot the relation-
ship between actual-ideal time and time as an idea in God's mind. 
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SillCe the momentum tor step (A) is derived from the d.1t-
ferent1at1ons, let ua turn to them. 
What, therefore, is the meaning of {l) 19t~~l Sile and 
ot (2) l}folut! till! in Leibniz's view? !he anaweril)g o~ this 
question is facilitated b7 examining the origin ot men•• 
notion of time. Since apace and time stand in an analogous 
relationship, it seems helptul to consider first, the problem 
of hov men come to torm the notion or absolute space, and 
then of time. Su:rpris1.ngl7 enough, the reader will discover 
that Leibniz talks of the origin of men's notion ot duration, 
and not ot time. So, one is led into the examination ot tbe 
relationship between duration and time. 
Leibniz otters the following rather lengtey- account, of 
how men can arrive at a notion or space without need <>f sup-
posing any absolute reality. beyond consideration ot the situa-
tion ot things. 
4?. I will here sh.ow, how men ooh to form to 
themselves the notion ot space. They consider that 
m~ things exist at once and they obsert'e in them 
a certain order or co-existence, according to which 
the relation ot one thing to another la more or less 
simple. This order, is their situation or distance. 
When it happens that one ot those co-existent things 
changes its relation to a multitude ot others, which 
do not change their relation among themselves; and 
that another thing, new1y come, acquires the ea.me 
relation to the o't:hers, as the former had; we then 
say, it 1• oom• into the place of the fo:rmer1 and 
this change. we call a motion in that bod)". vherein 
is the immediate cause or the change, And though 
mDn.7• or even all the co-existent things, should 
change aocord.ing to certain known rules of direction 
and swiftness; 7et one ~ always determine the 
relation of situation, which every co-existen.t acquires 
with respect to eve17 other co-existent; and even that 
relation which &llJ" other co-existent would have to 
this, or which thia would have to any other, it it had 
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not changed, or 1r 1t had ebanged any otherwise. And 
sup,posing, or feigning, that among those co-existents, 
there is a sufficient number or them, which have unde~ 
gone no change; then we may say, that those which ha.ve 
such a relation to those fixed existents, as others 
had to them be.tore, have now the game J2lace which 
'hose others had. An4 that which comprenends all those 
places, is called space. Which shows, that in order to 
have an idea. ot place, and consequently ot space, it is 
sutfioient to consider these relations, an<l the rules 
ot their changes, without needing to tancy aJ13 absolute 
reality outside the things whose situation we oonsider.66 
So, according to the view of Leibniz, men consider ·th.at many 
things exist at once and observe a certain order of co-existence 
among the simultaneously existing things. irhis order of co-
existence is more or leas a simple relation of one thing to 
another, which relation is the situation or distance ot one 
thing from another. A ~o-existing thing changes its relation 
66
"4?. Voicy comment lea hommes viennent a se former la 
notion de i • espaoe. Ila considerent que pl uaieui~s choses exJ.s-
tent i la toia, et 1la 7 trouvent un certain ordre de coexis-
tence, auivant lequel le rapport des uns et des autres est 
plus ou aoins simple. O'est leur situation ou distance. 
Lorsqu'il arrive 7u'un de ees coexistens change de ce rapport 
i une multitude d autrea, sans qu'ils en changent entre etDC, 
et qu•w ~ouveau venu aoquiert le rap1~ort tel que le premier 
avoit eu a d'autres, on dit qu'il est venu i aa place, et on 
appelle ce changement wi mouvement qui ost dans celuy ou est 
la cause immediate du changement. Et quand plusieurs, OU meme 
tous, ohangeroient selon oertaines regles connues de direction 
et de vitesse, on peut tour~ours determiner le rapport de situa-
tion que ohaoun acquiert i chacun; et meae cel117 que cbaque 
autre auroit ou qu•11 auroit a chaque ature, s'il n•avo1t point 
change, ou a'il avoit autrement change. Et auppoaent ou teign-
ant que parJ13' ces coexiatens 11 y a.it un nombre euf'tisant de 
quelque W'lS 1 qui n'ayent point eu de changement en eux, on dira CJ.Utt oeux qui on.\ un rapport a ces existens tixea, tel 
que d autrea avoient aupararant a ewe, ou.t eu la meme place 
que ces derniers avoient eue. Et ce qui camprend toutes cea 
places, eat appell' Espace. Ge qui tait voir que pour avoit 
i•tdie de la place, et par consequent de l'espace, 11 suttit 
de considerer cea rapports et les regles de leur changemena, 
$ans avo1t beaoin d• se figurer icy aucune realite absolue bore 
des choses dont on considere la situation." Gerhardt, f!lirlo-
sophisohe SChr&tttn, VII, p. 400. 
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to a multitude or other oo-exieting thinga (whioh ttother" co-
existing things do not change their relation among themselves). 
~is change (or relation, of place) is called "a motion in 
that body. wherein is the 1mmed1ate cause ot the ohnnge. 0 
The *'newl;y-comeu 1lh:J.ng, conceived as "that body," has motion 
within itsel.f'. The motion within the "newl7-come 0 thing is 
the illlmediate cause of the cha.nge. "For when the immediate 
cause ot the change is i.n the body, that body is twl7 in 
motioni and then the situation of other bodies, with respect 
to it, will be changed consequently, though the cause of that 
change be not in them."6? 
The relation of s:ltuation, which every co-existent -cquires 
with regard to every other co-existent, can be determined. 
The re!ation of situation (which any co-existent would have 
to eve17 other co-existent .2l ever;y other co-existent to any 
other) can be determined regardless of whether the relation 
between co-existing things has changed .2£ has not changed. 
Let it be assused that among the number ot things co-existing, 
G?,•53. Je ne trouve rien dans la definition hu1t1eme des 
prinoipes Mathematiques de la Nature, ny dans le !5cholie de 
cette definition, qui prouve, ou puisae frouver la realiti de 
l'espaoe en soy. Oependant j'accorde qu il 7 a de la ditter-
ence entre un mouvement abaolu veritable d'un corps, et un 
simple ohangement relatit de la situation par rapport a un 
autre corps. Car loraque la cause ir:uaediate du changement 
est da.na le corps, 11 est veritablement en mouveaent; et alors 
la attuation des autres par rapport a lu7, aera changee par 
consequence, quoyque la cause de ce cbangement ne soit point 
en eux. Il est Yr&1 qu'a parler exacteaent, 11 n'y a point 
de corps qui aoit partaiteaent et entierement en repos1 aais 
c•est de quo1 on ta.it abstraction, en coneiderant la choae 
mathemat1quement.ff l!!&A•• VII, p. 404. 
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there is a sufficient number ot them which undergo no change 
ot place and let us term the su.ttidant nuaber of things under-
going no such change ot place, fixed existent. Tboae thinf~S 
which have suoh a relation to these fixed existents, as others 
had to tne.m betore, have now the same plaoe which these others 
had. That comprehending all those places, is called apace. 
Upon review ot the passage just considered, what seems 
to become apparent, is the need tor clarification ot the dis-
tinction between place and situation. Leibniz does offer 
such a clarifioation: 
And here it may not be amiss to consider the differ-
ence between place, and the relation ot situation, 
which is in the body that f'ills up the place. For 
the place ot A and ». is the same,; whereas the rela-
tion ot A to tixed bodieo, is not precisely and indi-
vidually the same, as the relation wh1oh B (that comes 
into its place) will have to the same tixed bodies; 
but theee relations agree only. For, 'ho different 
subjects, as A and B,. cannot have precisely the same 
individual affection; it being impossible, that the 
same individual accident should be 1u_two subjects, 
or pass from one subject to another.68 
Given the prior oona1derations, how is it possible tor 
men to form a notion of absolute space? In attempting to 
answer this question, Leibniz considers two examples of how 
the mind torms the notion. The f'iret example is as tollowss 
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" ••• 4?. Et 11 est bon icy de considerer la ditterence 
qu'il y a entre la place et entre le rapport de situation du 
corps qui occupe la place. Car la place d'A et de B est la 
meme, au lieu que le rapport d'! aux corps ?ixes. nTest pas 
preciaement et 1nd1v1duellement le mime que le rapport q.ue B (qui prendra sa place) aura aux mimes fixes; et ces rapporti 
conviennent seulement. Car deux su~ets ditterens, comme A et 
B, ne sauroient avoir preciaement la mime affection indivrdu-
ille; un meme accident individuel ne se pouvant point touver 
en deux sujects, ni passer de sujec en sujet.n ~., VII, 
pp. 400-01. 
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And here it may not be amiss to consider the differ-
ence between place, and the relation of situation, 
whioh is in the body that fills up the place. For, 
the place ot A and B, is the same; whereas the rela-
tion ot A to fixed bodies, is not precisely and indi-
vidually the same, as the relation which B (that comes 
into its place) will have to the same fixed bodies; 
but these relations agree only. For two ditterent 
subjects, as A and B, cannot have precisely the same 
individual affection; it being impossible, that the 
same individual accident should be in two subjects, 
or pass from one subject to another. But the mind not 
contented with an agreement, looks tor an identity, 
tor something that should be truly the same; and con-
ceives it as being extrinsic to the subject: and. this 
is what we here call elaoe and space. But this can 
:~!~e~: ~e1~i!~ !~!~!v:~ni~!n!~gl~c::i!:1~r0;:~;tions.69 
Briefly expressed. what is Leibniz's first example or how the 
mind forms the notion or absolute space? Bodies A and B dit-
tering intrinsically do not share exactly the ea.me accidents. 
SUppose B now occupies the same place that A tormerly occu-
pied. The relation ot A to the f'ixed existents when it occu-
pied the place now occupied by B~ is not the same as B's pre-
sent relation to the fixed existents. How is it possible that 
the relation of situation between A and the f'ixed existents 
69" ••• 4?. Et 11 est bon icy de considerer la difference 
qu'il y a entre la place et entre le rapport de situation du 
corps qui occupe la place. Car la place d'A et de B est la 
mime, qu lieu que le rapport d'! aux corps ?ixea, nTest pas 
precisement et individuellement le m~e que le rapport quo B (qui prendra sa place) aura aux m~mes fixes; et ces rapports 
conviennent aeulement. Car deux sujecte ditferens, com.me A 
et B, ne sauroient avoir preoisement la meme affection indi-
viduelle; un mime accident individuel ne ae pouvant point 
touver en deux sujets, ni passer de aujet en aujet. Mais 
l'esprit non content de la eonvenance, chercbe une identite. 
une chose qui soit veritablement la mime, et la concoit comme 
hors de ces suJets; et c•est oe qu'on appelle icy place et 
espace. Oependant,cela ne sauroit etre qu'ideal, contenant 
uncertain ordre ou ireaprit concoit l'application des rap-
ports: comme l'esprit se peut figurer un ordre consistant en 
lignes Genealog1ques, dont les grandeurs ne conaiateroient que 
dans le nombre des generations ou chaque personne auroit ea 
place." Ibid. 
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.!.e! B and the fixed existents id!fers, although B now occupies 
the former place of A? The relation of situation differs 
because bodies A and B do not share exactly the same acci-
dents, the same individual affections. The mind looks tor 
an identity, that is, something extrinsic to both A and B 
that should be truly the same. Given the fact that the rela-
tion of situation differs tor A and B and that place remains 
-
the same for A and B, the mind fixes upon the notion of place 
as that something which is extrinsic to both A and B. That 
which is extrinsic to A and B (i.e., place) is also called 
space.?O 
?Oct. Ibid., VII, p. 415. Therein Leibniz notes that: 
'*104. Je necJis point que l • Espace est un Ord.re OU une situa-
tion qui rend les choses situables; ee seroit parler galimatias. 
On n•a qu'a considerer mes proprea paroles, et i les joindre 
a ce qui ~e viens de dire cy dessus, num. 47, pour montrer 
comment l esprit Vient a se former l' idee de l' Espaee, 98..llS 
qu'11 faille qu'il y air un Etre reel et abaolu, qui y reponde, 
hors de l'esprit et hors des rapports. Je ne dis done point, 
que l' Espace est un ordre ou situation, r:la.is un ordre d.es situa-
tions, ou selon lequel les situations sont rangees; et que 
l'espace abstrait est cet ordre de situations, eoncuea oomme 
possibles. Ainsi c•est quelque chose d'ideal, ma.is il semble 
qu•on ne me veut point entendre. J'a:y repondu deja icy num. 
54 ~ l'objection qui pretend qu'un Ord.re n•est point capable 
de quantite." 
With regard to the above passage (that is, nW!lber 104), 
passage number 47 to which Leibniz refers, is the passage pre-
sently under discussion, which discussion extends from page 
thirty-eight to page torty-tive in the body or this paper. 
J?assage number 54 1a as follows: ••54. Je ne connois aucune 
ObjectiOtl a laquelle Je ne Cro;ye d '8.V01r repondu Su£f1samment. 
Et quant a cette objection, que l'Espace et le Temps sont des 
quantites, ou plustost des ehoaes douees de quantite, et que 
la situation et l'ordre ne le sont point, je reponds que 
l'ordre a aussi sa quantite; il a ce qui precede et oe qui 
suit, 11 y a distance ou intervalle. Les choses Relatives ont 
leur quantite. aussi bien que les Absolues: par exemple, les 
Raisona ou proportions dans les Mathematiques ont leur quan-
ti te, et se mesurent par les Logarithmes; et cependant ce sont 
des Relation.a. Ainsi quoyque le Temps et l' Zspace consistent 
en rapports, ils ne laisaent pas d'avoir leur quantite." Ibid., 
VII, p. 404. 
The second example, of bow the mind forms the notion of 
absolute space, is as follows: 
I shall allege another example, to show how the :mind 
uses, upon occasion of accidents which are in subjects, 
to fancy to 1 tselt somethin€~ answerable to these acci-
dents, out of the subjects. The ratio or proportion 
between two lines L and M, may be conceived three 
several ways; as a ratio of the greater L, to the lesser 
M; as a ratio ot the lesser Pl, to the greater L; and 
lastly, as something abstracted from both, that is, the 
ratio between L ar1d M, without considering which is the 
antecedent, or which the consequent; which the subject, 
and which the object. And thus it is, that proportions 
a.re considered in music. In the first way o.r consider-
ing the, L tbe greater; in the ~eeond. M the lesser, is 
the subject of that accident, which philosophers call 
relation. But, which ot them will be the subject, in 
the third way ot considering them? It cannot be said 
that both of them, L and M together, are the subject of 
auch an accident; tor it so, we should have an accident 
in two subjects. with one leg in one, and th• other in 
the other; which is contrary to the notion or accidents. 
'l'b.ere.tore we auat say• that this relation, in this third 
wa7 of considering it, is indeed out or the subjects; but 
being neither a substance, nor an accident, it must be 
a mere ideal thi11g, the considaration or which is never-
theless usetul.71 
?l" ••• 47. Je donneray encore un example de l'usage de 
i•eaprit de se former, a 1•occasion des accidena qui sont dans 
lea sujets, quelque chose qui leur reponde hors des su;jets. 
La raison ou proportion entre deux lignes ~ et ~ peut etre 
concue de trois tacons: comc.e raison du plus grand t au mondre 
M, comme raison du moind.re 1.IJ. au plus grant L, et en'lin co:mae 
quelque chose d'abstrait des dewc, c•est a !ire com.me la rai-
son entre l: et M, sane considerer lequel est l'anterieur ou 
le posterieur, !e sujet ou l'objet. Bt c'est ainsi que les 
proportions sont oonsiderees dans la !1uaique. Dans la pre-
miere consideration, L le plus grand est le sujet; dana la 
seoonde, ~ le moindre est le sujet de oet accident, que les 
philoeophes apellent relation ou rapport. Mais quel en eera 
le su3et da.ns le troisieme sens? On ne eauroit dire que tous 
les deux, L et ll ensemble, soyent le sujet d'un tel accident, 
car ainei nous auriona un Accident en deux sujots, Q.ui auroit 
une jambe dana l'un, et l'autre dans l'autre, ce qui est con-
tre la notion des a.ooidens. Done 11 taut= dire, que ce rap-
port dans ce troisieme sens est bien hors des sujets; mais 
que n•etant ny substance ny accident, cela doit etre une chose 
purement idea.le, dont la consideration ne la.isae pas d'etre 
utile.tt ~·• VII, P• 401. 
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'l'he problem that Loibniz is confronting is that of accounting 
tor space without needing to fancy any absolute reality. At 
the end of the first example, Leibniz states that consideration 
of space as somehow extrinsic to A and B is an ideal thing. 
Here Leibniz is stating basically the same as he sta'ted in 
the first example, but with regard to L and I1 (that is, here 
he is showing how mind uses, upon the occasion of accidents 
which are in subjects, to fancy to itself something answerable 
to these accidents, outside the aubj~cts). The problem seems 
to be that or fancying the "ideal thing,'' which is extrinsic 
to L and M, as an absolute reality. 
It must be remembered that Leibniz holda a relational 
conception ot space and time. The origin ot ma.n's notion 
of the relational conoeption ot space has been just consi-
dered. Men. in considering the relational conooption of 
apace, seen to move beyond this conception and fancy an n1deal 
thing" as an absolute reality. That is, men tancy "ideal 
space" as absolute space or actual apace as absolute space. 
The reason, tor examining Leibniz's notion ot the origin both 
of space and of absolute space, was to be able to locate his 
notion of absolute ti.me. Since space and time stand in an 
analogical relation, is one now permitted to sa;;r, given cer-
tain textual support, that men fancy "ideal timen as absolute 
time or actual tim.e as absolute time? The answer is no. 
Leibniz does not offer a comparable discussion ot time. This 
is to say that, Leibniz does not discuss (1) how men come to 
form the nntion of time, or actual time and (11) how men come 
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to form the notion or absolute time. Yet, Leibniz does 
relate •how the constant train of ideas in our mind furnishes 
us with the idea of duration.•72 
Before proceeding onward, a !ew briet remarks seem in 
order. First of all, we set upon the task ot attempting to 
differentiate between (1) actual time and (2) absolute time. 
Secondly, the distinotiona behind us are hardly textually 
justified. Thirdly, since no f'urther light is able to be 
shed on the absolute time distinction, it seems appropriate 
to withdraw trom further consideration of it. And fourthly, 
since further consideration ot actual time leads to truittul 
results, it will be subject to subsequent development, 
As was previously stated, the distinction between (1) 
actual time and (4) •athamatical time tails in the sense that 
it leads to a conception of time which is, in es':ience, a rela-
tive, sensible, apparent measure. This relative, sensible, 
apparent measure is a mathematical measure based upon abstrac-
tion from things actually existing. Yet, a question seems in 
order. It the distinctions of actual time and mathema1Jical 
time fail, why the distinctions? It is my opinion that impor-
tant light can be abed upon Leibniz's notion ot time as an 
idealization of the existing relations between things, given 
the distinction. In the example of space, it was possible to 
talk about actual space, that is, the spatial relations among 
actually existing things in terms or place and relation of 
72Leibniz's notion or duration is discussed shortly, fol-
lowing the discussion ot (3) time a.a an idea in God's mind. 
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situation. Leibniz says that consideration or space 1$ an 
ideal thing which is, in tact, useful. Space is not the ulti-
mate framework of the universe just as ·time is not. that is, 
space and time are not properties o.f monads. Time, not being 
a propert~ of a monad, is an ideal thing which expresaes the 
relation between non-contemporaneous things. Granted this, 
the distinctions ot actual-ideal space and actual time seem 
useful. There ie, however, an additional way of viewing the 
actual time distinction. which leads into discussion or (3) 
time as an idea in God's mind. 
Let us, therefore, examine the texts wherein Leibniz 
discusses time as an idea within God's mind. Thetsxts are: 
59. When I speak of this world, I mean the whole 
universe ot material and immateria! creatures taken 
together, .trom the beginning of thin~'r,s. But if any 
one mean only the beginning of the material world, 
and suppose im1naterial creatures betore it; he would 
have somewhat more reason tor his supposition. For 
time then being marked by things that existed already, 
it would be no longer indifferent; and there m.ight be 
room for choice. And yet indeed, this would be onl7 
putting off the ditt1culty. For, supposing the whole 
universe ot immaterial and material creatures together, 
to have a beginning; there is no longer any choice 
about the time, in which God would place that begin-
ning. 73 
?3n59. Qua.nd Je parle de ce monde, \J'entends tout l'uni-
vers des creatures materiellea et immaterielles prises ensem-
ble, depuis le commencement des choses; maia si l'on n•enten-
do1t que le commencement du monde materiel, et supposoit 
avant luy des creatures immaterielles, on se mettroit un peu 
plus a la raison en eela. Car le temps alora estant marque 
par lea choses qui existeroient deja, ne seroit plus indiffer-
ent; et il y pourroit avoir du choix. Il est vray qu'on ne 
teroit que ditterer la difficulte, car supposant que l'univers 
entier des creatures lmm.aterielles et materielles ensemble a 
commence, 11 n•y a plus de choix sur le temps OU Dieu le vou-
droit mettre. 11 Gerhardt, Pbi,losophische Schrif'ten, VII, p. 
406. 
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106. 'Tis true, the im.men~1ty and eternity of 
God would subsist, though there were no creatures; 
but those attributes would have no dependence either 
on times or places. It there were no creatures, there 
would be neither time nor place, and consequently no 
actual space. The immensity of God is independent 
upon space, as his eternity is independent upon time. 
These attributes signify only, [with regard to these 
two orders or things] that God would be present and 
co-existent with all the things that should exist. 
And therefore ! don't admit what's here alleged, that 
1.f' God existed alone, there would be time and apace 
as there is now: whereas then, in my opinion, they 
would be only in the ideas of God as mere possibili-
ties. 'l'he immensity and eternity ot God, are thin.gs 
more transcendent, than the duration and extension ot 
creatures; not only with respect to the greatness, but 
also to tbe nature ot the things. Those divine attri-
butes do not imply the supposition of things extrinsic 
to God, such as are actual ~laces and times. These 
truths have been sufficiently acknowledged by divines 
and philosophers.?4 
So, by world Leibaiz means the whole universe of both material 
and immaterial creatures taken together from the beginning of 
things. Since the immensity and eternity of God would subsist 
?4 "106. Je soutiens que sans les Creatures, l'immensite 
et i•Eternite de Dieu ne laisseroient pas de subsister, mais 
sans aucune dependance n7 des temps ny des lieux. S'il n•y 
avoit point de creatures, il n•y auroit ny temps ny lieux; 
et par consequent point d 1 eapaoe actuel. L'immensite de Dieu 
est ind.ependante de l' espa.ce, comme l' eterni te de Dieu est 
independante du Te~ps. Elles portent seulement a l'egard de 
ces deux ordres de choses. que Dieu seroit present et coexie-
tant a toutes les choses qui exieteroient. Ainsi je n'ad.mete 
point ce qu•on ava.noe icy, que ai Dieu eeul existoit, 11 y 
auroit temps et espaoe, oomme a present. Au lieu qu'alors, 
a mon avis, ils ne seroient que dans les idees, eomme des sim-
ples possibilites. L'immensite et l'etern1te de Dieu sont 
quelque chose de plus eminent que la duree et l'etendue des 
creatures, non seulement par rapport a la grandeur, ma.is encore 
par rapport a la nature de la chose. Ces attribute Divins 
n'ont point beeoin de choses hors de Dieu, oom:ne sont lee 
lieux et temps aotuels. Oes verites ont ete asses reconnues 
par les Theologiens et par les Philosophes." Ibid., VII, 
PP• 415-16. 
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though there were no creatures, tPey have no dependence upon 
times o~ places. If there were no creatures there would be 
neither time nor place, and consequently no actual space. The 
immensity of God is independent of spnce, as his eternity is 
independent of time. Immensity and eternity signify only as 
regards the two orders ot things, that God would be present 
and co-exist with all the things thnt should exist. If God 
existed alone, there would not be time and space, es there is 
now. If God existed alone, time and space would be only in 
the ideas of God as mere possibilities. The immensity and 
eternity of God are things more transcendent than the duration 
and extension of creatures. Imoensity and eternity do not 
imply the supposition or things extrinsic to God, such as are 
actual places and times. 
What is the significance of tho above texts? First ot 
all, it ia noticeable that the distinction of time u.s an idea 
within God's mind.:is now textually supported. That is, if God 
existed alone, time (and space) would be only in the ideas or 
God as a mere possibility. Secondly, it is notable that the 
distinction ot actual times (and places) is made mention or. 
so, let us ask in what sense these above mentioned points 
stand related. It is my belief that Leibniz is contrasting 
them. But what does this mean? God, before aotualization of 
a best possible world, has in His mind an infinite number of 
possible worlds with their possible laws. This actual world, 
as it exists in God's mind as a possibility, has its temporal 
and spatial relations as mere possibilities amon~ the ideas 
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of God. When the best possible world is actualized, so are 
time and space as they are in the ideas o.t God as possibili-
ties. When time and space are actualized along with the world, 
on.e then has an actual world with its actual time and actual 
space. Such thing& extrinsic to God are actual times and 
actual places. 
If the reader will recall, the problem in step (A) is to 
give a partial explanation of what is meant by saying that 
time is the form o! order among things. This problem exists 
within the greater task ot attempting to ascertain what Leibniz 
means by saying that 'time is an idealization or the existing 
relations among things.• 
Thus tar, our anal7aes have culminated in the contrast 
between time as an idea in God•s mind and actual time. From 
the analyses, it seems possible to interpret actual time as 
expressing the f'orm of order wnong actually existing things 
in contrast to time as the form of 01--der among things existing 
in God's mind as possibilities. But, this seeras unsatistaetory 
to the extent that "form of order" is left unexplained. Never-
theless, the contrast ma.7 be viewed as a major find. This is 
true to the extent that it enables us to shift our perspeot1ve 
with regard to actual time. With this shitt, we are able to 
place actual time in a mathematical perspective. '?his allows 
us, in my opinion, to claim that by "form of order" Leibniz 
means the non-contemporaneous relations among things (that is, 
the universal order or change). 
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(B) 
As stated at the beginning or this chapter, the explana-
tion of step (B) rests upon the differentiation between (1) 
actual time, (4) ma.theinatica.l time and (5) mathematical infin-
ite and true in£inite (eternity). This step ie directly 
related to step (A) through the actual time distinction. In 
step (I), a change or perspective occurs with regard to actual 
time. Actual time is no longer contrasted with time as an 
idea in God's mind. Rather, it is placed in a mathematical 
perspective. This is to say that actual time is related to 
mathematical time such that both merge into a relative, sen-
sible, apparent, mathematical measure of time. 
The unraveling of the mathematical time distinction leads 
into examination of (a) the origin of the minds idea of dura-
tion, (b) the relationship between apace, extension and matter, 
and (c) the relationship between time, duration and motion, 
in terms of the {Ustinetion between aotu.al time and mathemati-
cal time. Following the discussion of mathematical time, the 
mathematical infinite and the true infinite (eternity) are 
discussed. 
Prior to effecting the change or perspective with regard 
to actual time, let us summarize the contrast between E1ctual 
time and time as a possibility in God's ideas. 
As noted in step (A), God before actualization of a best 
possible world, has in His mind an infinite number of possible 
worlds with their possible laws. Thia actual world, as it 
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exists in God's mind as a possibility, has its temporai and 
spatial relations. When the best possible world is actual-
ized, so are tine and space as they are in the ideas of God 
as possibilities. When time and apace are actualized along 
with the world, one then has an actual world with its actual 
time and actual space. 
Now, let us place the above discussion of actual times 
and actual spaces 1n a different perspective. The focus is 
that of viewing actual times and actual places from the per-
spective of this actually existing world, instead or as pos-
sibilities within God's mind. Given this, actual time can be 
thought of as relative, sensible and apparent. Actual tioe 
ex;iresaee the non-contemporaneous relations (that is, 1;he 
torrn of order) among actually existing sensible things, which 
relations are visible to sight. Relative sensible, apparent 
time is, in essence, a mathematical measure based upon abstrac-
tion trom actually existing things. These observations, to 
be later textually supported, lead into a consideration of the 
mathematical side ot time, and in particular, of (4) 1athema-
tical time. 
The distinction ot mathematical time cannot be textually 
supported in Leibniz's writings, in the manner or being able 
to point to a specific passage wherein this distinction occurs. 
Yet, it is my opinion that it is useful, given the factor ot 
its expressing the mathematical side or time. 
Let us begin to unravel the mathematical aspect of time 
through investigation into Leibniz's ditf'erentiation between 
time and duration. To this end, a review of the text involving 
his account of the origin ot the minds idea of duration, 
seems appropriate. According to Leibniz: 
''916. Ph. It is not motion, but a constant 
succession or ideas which gives us the idea of 
duration. 
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'rb. (A succession of perceptions awakes in us 
the i?ea or duration, but it does not make it. our 
perceptions never have a succession sufficiently 
constant and regular to oorrespond to that of time, 
which is a. continuum uniform and simple, like a 
straight line. Changing perceptions furnish us the 
occasion for thinking ot time, and we measure it by 
uniform changes. But were there nothing uniform in 
nature, time could not be determined, as space like-
wise could not be determined if there were no fixed 
or immovable body. So that knowing the rules of 
different motions, we can always refer them to the 
uniform intelligible motions, and see beforehand by 
this means what will happen through t~e different 
motions taken together. And in this sense time is 
the measure o! motion, 1.e., uniform motion ia the 
measure of non-uniform mot1on.J"?5 
?5''§16. Ph. Oe n'eat pas le mouvement, m.ais une suite 
constante d'idees qui nous donne l'idee de la durie. TH. (Une suite de perceptions reveille en nous l'idee de la duree, 
mais elle ne la tait point. Nos perceptions n•ont jamais une 
suite aasis constante et reguliere pour repondre a oelle du 
temps qui est un continu unitorme et simple, comme une ligne 
droite. Le changement des perceptions nous donne occasion 
de penser au temps, et on le mesure par des changemens uni-
tormes: mais quand 11 n•7 auroit rien d'unitorme dans la 
nature, le temps ne laisseroit pas d'estre determine, comme 
le lieu ne laisseroit pas d'estre determine auasi quand 11 
n'y auroit aucun corps fixe ou immobile. c•est que connois-
sant les regles des mouvemens difformes, on peut toujours les 
rapporter a des mouvemens uniformes intelligibles et prevoir 
par oe mo7en oe qui arrivera par mouvemens dittormes, on peut 
toujouro les ra.pporter a d.es mouvemens uniform.es intelligibles 
et prevoir par ae moyen ce qui arrivera par des d1tterens 
mouvemens joints ensemble. Et dans ce sens le temps est la· 
mesure du mouvement, e•est a dire le mouvement unifo.rme est 
la mesure du mouvement difforme.J" Ibid., V, pp. 138-39. 
lfumber sixteen refers to the paragraph number in the .!!! 
Essays Concernin6 Human Understanding. 
The Rew Essa;zrs ~oncernin§ Human Understa.ndinf is composed 
in dialogue l'orm. Wl?fi." ana ".Ni." refer to Pb'.Ita ethes and 
Theophilus. l?hilaletnes and Thiophilus are two friends who 
converse together. Philalethes states the position or John 
Locke, whereas Theophilus (who is Leibniz) gives his views 
on the position. 
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From the quotation, it is to be noted that the constant train 
ot ideas within our minds furnishes us with the id.ea or dura-
tion. Motion does not furnish us with the idea of duration. 
The constant train of ideas furnishes us with the idea of 
duration but it (the constant train or ideas) does not make 
it (the idea or duration). Our constant train of ideas is 
never surf icientl:r con.stant and regular to correspond to that 
or time. Time is a uniform and simple continuum like a straight 
line. The ohan.ge or ideas "gives us occasion to think of time, 
and it is measured by uniform changes." If there should be 
nothing uniform in nature, time would. not cease to be deter-
oined. 
Since the problem or the relationship between time and 
duration is being confronted, a few remarks by way of review 
ueem necessary. It should be remembered that, according to 
Leibniz, the origin of men•s notion of space is external--
that is, men observed and considered things around them and 
from this they arrived at a notion of space. Leibniz did n~ 
say that men observed and considered the things around them, 
and from this formed a notion of time. Rather, he talks ot 
the origin or men's idea or duration. Since the constant 
train of ideas in our mind furnishes us with the idea of dura-
tion, it seems possible to say that men's noti~n ot duration 
is the result or internal observation. The change of ideas 
in our mind does, though, give us occasion to think of time. 
From the text now under consideration, and in view or the 
remarks just made, at least two questions present themselves. 
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Tbe questions a.re: 
(1) \./hat is the relationship between motion and duration? 
(2) What is the relationship between duration and time? 
To facilitate an answer to the questions, an examination or 
some related texts seems appropriate. The relevant texts a.re: 
61. I shall not enlarge here upon my opinion 
explained elsewhere, that there are no created sub-
atances wholly destitute of matter. For I hold with 
the ancients, and according to reason, that angels 
or intelligences, and souls separated trou a gross 
body, have always subt1le bodies, though they them-
selves be incorporeal. The vulgar philosopher easily76 admits or all sorts of tictionsi mine is more strict. 
62. I don't say that matter and space are the 
same thing. I only say, there is no space, where 
there is no matter; and that space in itselt is not 
an absolute reality. Space and matter ditter, as 
time and. motion. However, these things, though 
different, are inseparable.'7'7 
63. But yet it does not at all follow, that 
matter is eternal and neceaaa.ry; unlesa we suppose 
space to be eternal and neceas~ry: a supposition 
ill-grounded 1n all respects.?8 
?661. Je ne veux point m•arrester icy sur mon sentiment 
explique ailleurs, qui porte qu•11 n'y a point de substances 
creees entierement dest1tuees de matiere. Car je tiens avec 
lea Anciens et avec la raison, que lea Anges ou les Intelli-
gences, et les Ames separees du corps grossier, ont toujours 
des corps ~ubt1ls, quoTQu'elles mimes so7ent 1ncorporelles. 
La Pbilosophie vulgaire ad.met aiaement toute sorte de fic-
tions; la mienne eat plus severe. 11 Ibid., VII, p. 406. 
?? 1162. Je ne dis point que la matiere et l'espaoe est la 
meme chose; je dis seulement qu'il n•y a point d'espace, ou 
il n•y a point de matiere; et que l'espace en luy m8'me n•est 
point une realite absolue. L'espace et la mat1ere dit.terent 
comme le temps et le mouvement. Oependant·ces choses, quoyque 
ditferentes, se ;;rouvent inseparables." Ibid., VII, p. 406. 
?B"63. Mais 11 ne e'«m.suit nullement que la ma.Uere soit 
eternelle et neoessaire, si non en suppoeant que l'espace eat 
eternal et necessaire: supposition mal tondes en toutes 
ma.nieres.u Ibid. 
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There is, according to Leibniz, no created substance wholly 
destitute of matter. Leibniz is not claiming that matter and 
space are the same thing. Leibniz is claiming that there ia 
no space, where there is no matter. Space in itself is not 
an absolute reality. Space and matter difter, as time and 
motion differ. Given the tact that space and matter differ, 
they are however, inseparable. Given the tact that time and 
motion differ, they are however, inseparable. But, what does 
it mean to say that time and motion are inseparable? How is 
one to view the ineeparability of time and motion? Perhaps 
the following short passage will suggest an answer. 
Time is the order ot non-contemporaneous things. 
It is thus tlie unlversal or&er of change In wfiiofi 
we ignor99the aP.ol!Ic ~ind of changes that have oooured.'I 
Perhaps by motion, it may be possible to interpret Leibniz as 
meaning change, and more specifically the universal order of 
change in which the particular kind of change is ignored. 
Since time is the order of non-contemporaneous things, I take 
Leibniz to mean that time concerns things external to the mind, 
as does space. Still though, how is ti.me related to things 
external to the mind, to things actually existing? To shed 
some light upon this problem, let us examine three texts con-
cernin~ extension, duration, and number, namely: 
••• Exteuaion never appaare to us other than as 
a plurality of things whose togetherness is continu-
ous, and we find nothing more presupposed in it than 
?9c, I. Gerhardt, ed., l'lathemet~ache Schriften, VII, PP• 
l?-28 quoted in Philip Wiener, ea., :eI\nlz Selec~Ions, P• 202. 
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just this fact. Aleo the connection of these things 
io not a necessary one; tor we can take away something 
and substitute something else for it without this 
making much difference. If we distinguish extension 
from extended thing,, then it is something abstract 
like duration or like number considered detached from 
things, in which the connection of the parts is just 
as necessary as with extension. So in the trinity 
three intelligible unities are held together through 
an eternal bond, although the connection of three 
things is perhaps not a necessary one. It we think 
ol removing these determined things, then others alwa.7s 
remain behind and number never lacks objects that can 
be counted; also there is just as little emptiness 
among them as there is in space or time or other orders 
of relationship - it we do not assume the universe 
annihilated so that only pure possibility remains. 
So that is what extension, duration, and number are 
without thinga, if we also regard their common substance 
as a kind of Platonic idea. Extension is furthermore 
a relative concept, for it is related to a determined 
nature whose spread it represents; duration is related 
to a continually persisting subject. Extension then 
bas the peculiarity that different extended things are 
tound sucoessivel7 in one and the same place, that is, 
they can enter into the same relation in the order ot 
coexistence. whereas time is peculiar in that seYeral 
elemente can exist together at the same instant.BO 
SO"Sed ut ad rem .redeam, numquam reper1em.us }5xtensionem. 
sine rebus pluribus quarum continua sit coexistentia, neque 
aliud quid deprehendemua in ea quam hoe ipsum quod tales res 
intelliguntur. Nexus quoque earum necessarius non eat, pos-
sunt enim aliquae rerum. illarum tolli, nee refert quod aliae 
sunt substituendae. Extensio autam si ab extensis distinguas, 
a.betractum a.liquid est, ut duratio vel ut numerus aejunctua a 
rebus, in quo connexio partum eodum modo necessaria eat ut in 
extenaione. Sic in ternario tres unitates intelligibiles 
aeterno vinculo oolligantur, ets1 trium rerum propos1tarum. 
connexio torte necessaria non sit; quibusdam tamen demtis al1ae 
supersunt, et num.quwn desunt res numeeris, nee magis in illia 
vacuum est quwa in loco aut in tempore alusque ordinibus. nisi 
universwn destructum pons.mus ut solae supersint possibilita.tes. 
Id enim sunt ex:tensio. durs.tio, numeri sine rebua, etai vulgo 
ad instar idea.rum Platonicarum ut substantiae concipiantur. 
Extensio etiam relativa eat ad aliquam. naturam oujus oit dit-
fuaio, ut duratio ad rem quae persistit. Illud interim pecu-
11are est Extensioni, quod uni eidemque loco diversa extensa 
suecessiva quadrant, id est in aliorum situm in ordine coexis-
tentiarum auccedunt; sed tempori peouliare est, quod plura 
sunt in tempore eodem simul." Gerhardt, :fbi!_osoRhische SCh:ri~­
ten, II, p. 234. 
-
uantitY of s ace. It is 
false o con;,oun ex ens on, as s commonly dona, 
with extended things, and to view it as substance. 
If the quantity of space is continuously and uni-
formly diminished, then it becomes a uoint which 
has zero magnitude.Bl . 
Duration is the qun.ntity of time. I.f the quant•r~ty..._o~lr-rt~r·m·e-ips--.c•o~n~t~i-nu·o-u-s~l~y--a~n~d-unif ormly 
diminished, the t1m§ passes into an instant which 
haa zero magnitude.62 
It seems possible to briefly summarize the notable points in 
the above texts, aocordingly1 
Space 
(1) Given the tact that space and matter differ, they 
are, however, inseparable. 
(2) Extension is a relative concept, which is related 
to a determined nature, whose spread it represents. 
(3) It extension is distinguished .from extended things, 
then it ie something abstract in which the connec-
tion of parts is necessary. 
(4) :Extension is the quantity or space. 
Time 
-
(1) Given the taot that time and motion ditter, they are 
however, inseparable. 
(2) Time is the universal order of change, in whioh the 
specific kind of changes occuring are ignored. 
(3) Time is measured by uniform changes. 
(4) Time is a uniform and simple continuum, like a 
81c. I. Gerhardt, ed., Mathematische Schriften, VII, pp. 
l?-28 quoted in Philip Wiener, e~ •• 1i.ii9nlz §~Iections, p. 202. 
82Ibid. 
-
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straight line. 
(5) Duration is the quantity of time. 
(6) Motion does not furnish ue with the idea of duration, 
rather the constant train o:t iceas furnishes us with 
the idea of d'J.ration. 
(?) our constant train ot ideas ia never suffioientl7 
constant and regular to correspond to that ot time. 
(8) If duration is distinguished trom things, then it is 
something abstract in which the connection of the 
parts is necessary. 
(9) Duration is related to a continually persisting 
subject. 
ltu.mber 
(1) It number is distinguished from extended things, 
then it is something abstract in which the connec-
tion Of the parts is just as neceS88.l7 as with 
extension. 
(2) .Ex:tension, duration, and number are without things, 
it we do assume the univeree annihilated so that 
only pure possibility remains. 
As previously stated, the presently listed points will 
facilitate in answering the question as to 'how time is related 
to things external to the mind, to things actually exieting,• 
as well as to the earlier questions, namely, (l) 'What is the 
relationship between motion and duration.?' and (2) 'What ia 
the relationship between duration and time?•.' These questions 
exist within the task of attempting to account tor th& related-
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ness ot mathematical time (ot the mathematical aspect ot time) 
and ot actual time (of the relative, sensible, apparent aspect 
ot time). And this relatedness expresses what is, in my 
opinion, Leibniz's conception of time as the idealization ot 
the exis,ing relations among things. So, let us proceed. 
What about the distinction between actual time and mathe-
matical time? Ia one able to draw it with tuch exactitude 
that both actual-ideal time and mathematical time are clear 
in their own right? 'l'he answer seems to be, no. It is true 
that the texts examined seem to support the distinctions. 
Yet, there appears to be a fundamental problem with regard to 
the distinction, in view or the texts regarding the differen-
tiation and relatedness of time and duration. 'l.'he difficulty 
arises with ~he attempt at conceiving of actual time without 
mention of measureab111t7. That is, it seems to me that one 
cannot talk suooeastully about time without consideration ot 
meaeureab111ty, except perhaps as an a nrtori category ot the 
mind. However, Leibniz ia not talking of' time as an a prior& 
category ot the mind. He seems to be somehow talking about 
time in terms of both motion and. universal-uniform change which 
is bound to the relations among things. The problem becomes 
one ot attempting to relate time and duration to universal 
unitorrn change and motion. Leibniz says that (1) the constant 
train of ideas turnishes ua with the notion ot duration and 
(ii) duration is a quantity of time. Let us interpret Leibniz 
as sug~esting that the origin of our idea ot duration is 
internal whereas its "applicability" is external. With this 
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move, we are able to relate time and duration to uniform 
change and motion. 
Actual time refers to things (both material and immater-
ial) and is ideal (that is, it is an idealization of the exist-
in.g relations among things). It is relative (not absolute) 
and sensible (given its reference to the phenomena). The con-
stant train of ideas furnishes us with the idea ot duration. 
Duration is a quantity of time (a mathematical measure of time). 
Time and motion differ, 7et they are inseparable. Time, as the 
universal order of oba.nge (or motion) in which the specific 
kind of changes(or motions) occuring are ignored, is measured 
by uniform changes. It is a uniform and simple continuum. 
But our ideas a.re not capable or giving us such a measure of 
time. Yet, if one forms determined units ot duration through 
abstraction from phenomena wherein the connection of parts is 
necessary, one can get a mathematical continuum (or that which 
is both continuous and selfsame wherein no distinction of con-
tent oan be made except through reference to something else). 
Duration is related to a persisting subject but it is also 
abstracted from a persisting subject (like extension from 
extended things). Duration distinguished from the persisting 
subject and considered quantatively, could be placed within a 
continuum, hence time. This step suggests the relatedness ot 
actual time and mathematical time. That is, actual time points 
out the relationship and concern with phenomena (the relative, 
sensible, apparent aspect of time) whereas mathematical time 
is concerned with duration and a continuum (the mathematical 
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aspect of time). with this, it seems to me that the distinc-
tion between actual time and mathematical time merges into 
relative, sensible, apparent, mathematical time. !this is to 
say that time, being tied to the relations among things, is 
a mathematical measure based upon abstraction from things. 
And, this expresses, in my epinion, what Leibniz means by 
saying that time is an idealization or the existing relations 
among things. 
The remaining conception of time to yet be considered is 
the (5) mathe!llatical intini!e and the true intt.nite.8' Its 
value of discussion, at this point in the paper, seems to lie 
in the factor of its giving a backward look at the problems 
regarding time just now considered. Since tbio ie true, a 
summary of the yet textually unsupported findings seems appro-
priate before proceeding with a review or the texts. 
Duration abstracted from things (from the persisting sub-
ject) is concerned. with a continuum. Given this, one can 
continually add discrete unita ot duration with a determined 
ratio ot increase, aa infinitum. According to Leibniz, the 
true infinite (eternity) viewed from the side ot "time" is not 
the mere addition of units, of times. It (the true infinite 
viewed as eternity) is the ground ot the mathematical time 
continuum, yet one comes to it secondl7 - that is, one is fiast 
acquainted with the time continuum and later with the true 
infinite, in the meaning of eternity. 
83 Ct. supra, PP• 37 and 51. 
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Now, let us examine the following five pasaages, in hopes 
of obtaining a notion ot the true infinite in regard to space 
and "time,tt namely: 
§l. Ph. one ot the most important notions is that 
ot tJii finite and the inlinite, which are regarded 
as modes of quant1t7• 
Th. rProperly speaking, it is true that there is 
an iiilin!te number ot things, ~' that there are 
always more or them than can be assigned. But there 
is no infinite number, neither line nor other infinite 
quantity, it these are understood as veritable wholes, 
as it is eaa7 to prove. The schools have meant or 
have been obliged to say that, in admitting a syncate-
gorematic intinite,1 as they call it, and not a cate-
gorem.atic infinite. The true infinite exists, strictly 
speaking, only in the absolute, which is anterior to 
all oompos!l*on, and is not formed by the additions 
ot parts.'). r 
§3. Pb. We have believed that since the power of 
the mind iO expand without limit its idea ot space b7 
new additions is always the same, it is thence that 
the idea of an infinite space is derived • 
.!l• (It is well to add that this is because the 
same ratio ia seen always to hold good. Let us take 
a straight line and prolong it until it is double the 
length ot the tirst. Now it is clear that the second. 
line, being pertectl;r similar to the tirat, may be 
itself doubled in order to have a third, which is 
still similar to the preceding; and the same ratio 
holding good always, it is never possible to stop the 
process; thus the line ~ay be prolonged to infinity, 
so that the consideration ot the infinite arises from 
that of similarity or from the same ratio, and its 
origin is the same with that of universal and neces-
sary truths. 'i'his shows us how what gives completion 
84
"§1. Ph. Une notion des plus importan.tes est celle du 
Fini et de l'Infini, qui sont regardies oomme des Modes de la 
Quantite. 
T.H.[A proprement parler, il &st vray qu'il y a une infinite de 
choses, c'est A dire qu•11 y en a tou~ours plus qu'on n'en puisse 
assigner. Mais 11 n'7 a point de nombre 1nf1n1 m1 de 11gne 
ou autre quantite 1nfin1e, si on lea prend pour des veritables 
Touts, comme il est aise de demonstrer. Les eooles ont voulu 
ou du dire cela, en admettant un intini s)Tncategorematique, 
eomme elles parlent, et non pas l'intini categorematique. Le 
vray infini a la rigueur n'est que dans l absolu, qui est anter-
ieur ii toute oomposi ti on, et n •est point fonae par l • addi t.ion 
des parties.:J" Gerhardt, Philosophif!~he Schritten, V, p. 144. 
to the conception ot this idea is round in ourselves, 
and cannot come from the experience of our senses, just 
as necessary truths cannot be proved by induction nor 
by the senses. The idea or the absolute is in us 
internally, like that of being; these aSsolutea are 
nothing else than the attributes of God, and it may 
be said that they are not less the source ot ideas. 
because God is himself the principle or beings. The 
idea or the absolute in relation to space, is only 
that ot the immensity ot God, and so of the others. 
But you deceive yourself in wishing to imagine an 
absolute space which is an infinite whole composed of 
parts; there is none such, it is a notion which impliea 
a contradiction, and these infinite wholes, and their 
opposed inf'1n1tes1mals, are used only in the calcula-
tions of s3imeters, just like the imaginary roots ot 
algebra.J" :> 
85"§. 3. PH. Nous avons crU' que la puisaance, qu•a l'esprit 
d'etendre sans fin son 1dee de i•espace par des nouvelles addi-
tions, estant tousjours la mime, c'est de la qu'11 tire l'idee 
d'une espace intini. TH. [Il est bon d'ajouter que c•est 
parcequ'on voit que la aime raison subaiste tousjours. l'ren-
nons une ligne droite et prolongeons la, enaorte qu'elle soit 
double de la premiare. Or 11 est clair, que la aeconde, estant 
partaitement aemblable a la premiere, peuteetre doubl6e de meme, 
pour avoir la tro1a1~me qui est encore aemblable aux preeeden-
tes; et la mEme raison ay-ant tousjours lieu, 11 n•est jama1s 
possible qu'on soit arreste; ainai la ligne peut estre prolongee 
a l'1ntini, de aorte que la consideration de l'in.f'ini vient 
de celle de la similitude ou de la mime raison, et son origine 
est la meme avec oelle des verit's universelles et neoessaires. 
Cela fait voir comment ce qui donne de l'aceompl1ssement ~la 
conception de cette idee, se trouve en nous m~es et ne aauroit 
venir des experiences des sens, tout comme lea verites neces-
salres ne sauroient estre prouvees par l'induction n7 par les 
sens. L'idee de l'absolu est en nous interieurement comme celle 
de l'Estre: cea absolus ne sont autre chose que les attribute 
de Dieu, et on peut dire qu 1 ils ne sont pas moina la source 
des id,es, que Dieu est luy meme le principe des Estres. L'idee 
de l'absolu par rapport a l'espace n'est autre que Celle de 
l'immensite de Dieu, et ainsi des autres. Mais on se trompe 
en voulant s'imaginer un espace absolu qui soit un tout 1nfini 
compose de parties, il n'y a rien de tel, c•est une notion qui 
implique contradiction, et ces touts infinis, et leurs opposes 
intinement petits, ne sont de mist que dana le calcul des rteo-
metres, tout comme les racines imaginairea de l'Alg~bre.J" 
Ibid., V, PP• 144-45. 
-
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§2?. Pb. In tact the ideas of time and eternity 
come from tne same source, for we can in our thought 
add certain lengths ot duration to one another as 
often as we please. 
1'b.. rnut in order to draw from them the notion 
or et'in:ii.Jl, it .is necessary to think besides that 
the same reason always exists for going farther. It 
is this rational consideration which achieves the 
notion of the infinite or the indefinite in possible 
progress. Thus the senses alone cannot suftiee to 
cause the formation ot these notions. And ultimately 
it may be said that jhe idea of the absolute is anter-
ior in the nature of ihlngs to tfia.t of the limits which 
are added, but we notice the former onty as je commence 
with what is limited and strikes our senses. "86 
§16. Pb. 1or the same reason we have no positive 
idea or an-Yntinite duration or of eternity, any more 
than of immensity. 
'l'h.. rx believe we have a positive idea ot both, 
and tli'I's Idea is a trqe one, provided it is not con-
ceived as an infinite whole, but as an absolute or 
attribute without limits which exists in reference to 
et;rnity, in the necessity of the existence ot God, 
wl nout depending upon parts and without the notions 
being tormed by an addition of time. We see further-
more in that way, as I have said alread7, that the ori-
gin of the notion or the infinite comes from the same 
source as that of necessary trutha.::JB? 
86
"§2?. PH. En effect l'idee du tetJps et celle de l'eter-
nite Viennent d'une mime source, car nous pouvons ajouter dans 
nostre esprit certaines longueurs de duree les unes aux autres 
aussi aouvent qu'il nous plait. TH. rMais pour en tirer la 
notion de l'eternite, 11 faut concevoir de plus, que la mime 
raison subaiste touajoure pour aller plus loin. C'est cette 
consideration des raisons qui acheve la notion de l'intini ou 
de l'indefini dana lea progros possible. Ainsi les sens seuls 
ne sauroient suffire a rat~e former ces notions. Et dans le 
fonds on peut dire, que l'idee de l'absolu eat anterieure dans 
la nature des choses a oelle dee bornes qu'on ajoute, mais nous 
ne raaarquons la premiere qu'en commencant par ce qui est borne 
et qui trappe nos sens.]" Ibid., pp. 140-41. 
S?"§• 16. PH. Par la meme raison nous n•avons done point 
d'idee positive d 1 une duree infinie ou de l'eternite, non plus 
que de i•1mmensite. TH. (Je croai que nous avone l'idee positive 
de l'une et de i•autre et cette idee sera vraye. pourveu qu'on 
n'y conco1ve point comme un tout in~ini, maia comma un absolu 
OU attribut sans bornes qui 88 trouve a l'egard de l'Eternite, 
dans la necess1te de l'existence de Dieu, sans y dependre des 
parties et sans qu•on en torme la notion par une additon de 
temps. On voit encor par la, comme j 8.1' dit deja, que l'origine 
de la notion de lrintini vient de la mime source que celle des 
veries necessair•s.J" Ibid., V, p. 146. 
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So, according to J~eibniz, infinity, in its original intention 
ia attributed to space, duration and number. It is true, pro-
perly speaking, that an infinity of things exists. An infinity 
of things exists in the sense that there are always more things 
existing than one can assign a number to. There does not 
exist any infinite number nor infinite line nor an other infin-
ite quantity, if ~a take the infinite number as ~ genuine whole 
or the infinite line as a genuine whole or the infinite quan-
tity as a genuine whole. The true infinite, strictly speaking 
is only the Absolute, whi.ch is anterior to all composition and 
is not formed of parts. We form the idea or infinity in the 
example of a straight line by prolonging it (the straight line) 
ad infinitum through use of the same ratio ot increase. 'l'he 
idea ot intini.ty in the example of the straight line is found 
in ua and does not arise from sense experience. The idea of 
the true infinite (the Absolute) is in us internally, like that 
of being. The idea of infinity (the absolute is nothing but 
the attribute ot God. The idea or the absolute 1a no less the 
source or ideas than God ia himself the principle of beings. 
The idea of the absolute in relation to space is no other than 
that of the immensity ot God. We deceive ourselves in wishing 
to 1ma.g1ne an absolute space, which would be an intinite com-
posed of parts. 'l'he idea of the absolute is anterior in the 
nature or things to that of the limits which are added. But 
we do not notice the absolute (the true infinite) except in 
begim1ing wit~: what is limited and 'which strikes our senses.' 
We have no positive idea of infinity nor ot infinite duration -
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tha.t is, the idda of indefinite pro1~reea with regard to the 
addition of parts 11nd determinate ratio of increase. We have 
a positive idea or. infinity or of eternity if wa conceive or 
eternity as grounded in the necessity of God !lDd ao an attri-
bute of God ~ if we conceive of eternity without depending 
upon parts and without .forming the notion by an addition ot 
times. 
Now, it ought to be recalled that time and duration was 
previously discussed in terms of measurabil1ty. It was noted 
that duration is the qu.,ntity of time, and time (which is mea-
sured b~ uniform changes) is a u11itorm and simple continuum, 
like a straight line. The idea. ot infinite time, mathemati-
cally spaa.lcing, could be formed in the example of' a straight 
line (a uniform and simple continuum) by prolonging it .wi 
1n£1n1tum through use of the same ratio of increaae with 
regard to a selected length or duration. Here infinite time 
depends upon the int1n1te addition or parts, ot timea. But 
how is it, that the idea of true infinite ditters from this 
"matheaatical" infinite? '!'he true in.finite, a.a regards "time," 
is the idea of eternity. One conceives of eternity without 
dependency upon parts and without .forming the notion by an 
addition of times. 
OHAPTm FOUR 
OONC.E:RNING 1'HE ~UES1'ION A~3 TO '~v'HAT MOMENT OF TIM.r; 
'l!HE WORLD wAS CREATED 
This cha.pter will investigate .further the relational 
conception or time. The proble= undertaken hare is that or 
attempting to ascertain why 'it is not meaningful, on Leib-
niz's view, to raise the question as to what moment of time 
the world was created.' 
The procedure is the following. First ot all, the pre-
suppositions ot the question, as to 'what moment ot time tile 
world was created,' are listed. l'his is followed by addi-
tional textual examination concerning unl1m1tad-lim.ited exten-
sion and motion. Next, a summary of Leibniz's positiou with 
regard to space, matter, motion and time is presented. 'l'he 
summary incorporates some of the material discussed in the 
previous two chapters with the texts just examined. In view 
ot the summacy, t!1e presuppositions ot Leibniz' a system, 
matching those or the question, are listed. Given these pre-
suppositions of Leibnis•s position, it will be evident that 
the question is not a meaningful one. 1'his being said, let 
us begin our inquiry into the presuppositions ot the question. 
The presuppositions ot the question as to what moment ot 
time the world was created seem to nwraber seven. namely: 
(1) Space exists prior to the creation ot the world. 
(2) Space may or may not be occupied by matter. 
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(3) The total auount of matt~T occupying space is ·not 
given, that is, there may be a greater or lesser 
amount of matter. 
(4) The world ia in space, is created in spnce. 
(5) The world is finite. 
(6) It space exists independently of tha world, then 
one can talk of the world moving within space. 
(7) Ir space is prior to tha world and exists indepen-
dently ot the world, then one oan inquire as to what 
time the world was created in space (and one can alao 
inquire ae to what time the world was destroyed in 
space). 
In view ot these seven listed presuppositions, let us 
attempt to locate the matching presuppositions or I,,eibniz' a 
system. To this end, the examination ot texts co110erning the 
problem of unlimited-limited extension and unlimited-limited 
duration seem helpful. The te.xta are: 
?3. He frequently confounds, in his ob~ectiona 
againat me, what God will not do, with what he cannot 
do. See above, Numb. 9 (and below Numb. 76:h For 
examplet God oan do every thing that is possible, but 
he will do only what is beat. And therefore ! don't 
say, as the author here will have it, that God cannot 
limit the extension of matter; but 'tis likely he will 
not do it, and that he has thought it better to set no 
bounds to matter.BS 
88n73. On confound souvent dans les obyeotions qu•on me 
tait, ce que Dieu ne veut point, avec ce qu 11 ne peut point. 
Vo~es ey deasus num. 9 et plus bas num. ?6. Par example, Dieu 
peut tnire tout ee qui est possible, maia 11 ne veut faire que 
le Meilleur. Ainsi je ne dis point, comm! on m'1mpute icy, 
que D1eu ne peut point donner des bornes a l'etendue de la 
matiere, mais 11 7 a de l'apparence qu•11 ne le veut point, 
et qu'il a trouve mieux de ne lU7 en point donner." Ibid., 
VII, P• 408. 
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?4. Fro~ extension to duration, non valet eonuo-
iuegtia. Though the extension of matter were unIImI-
ed, yet it would not follow t:n.at its duration would 
be also unlimited; nay, even a parte ante, it would 
not follow, that it had no beglnning. !? it is the 
nature of things 1n the whole, to grow unitomly in 
perfection; the universe of creatures must have had 
a beginning. And therefore, there will be reasons to 
limit the duration of things, even though there were 
none to limit their extension. Besides, the world's 
haVing a beginning, does not derogate fro~ the infin-
ity of its duration a parte Rost; but bounds or the uni-
verse would derogate from the lntinity or its extension. 
And therefore it is more reasonable to adnlit a begin-
ning or the world, than to admit any bounds ot it; 
that the character or its infinite author, may be in 
both res~ects pres9rved.~9 
Text number 9 is: "9• Mais de que Dieu ne peut cho1s1r que le 
meilleur, et d'en vouloir interer que ce qu'il ne choisit point, 
est impossible; c•est confondre lee Termee, la puiasance et la 
volonte, la necessite metaphysique et la necesaite morale, les 
essences et lea existences. Carce qui eat necessaire, l'est 
par son esJence, puisque l'oppose i~plique contradiction; mais 
le contingent qui exiete, doit son existence ?u principe du 
meilleur, rai~on sutfisante des choses. Et o est pour cela 
que je dis, que les motite 1nelinent sand necessiter et qu'il 
y a une certitude et infallibilite, maia non pas une necessite 
absolu dans les choses contingentes. Jo1gn6a a cecy, ce qui 
ce dira plus bas n. 73. n. ?6." Ibid., VII, P• 390. 
Text number ?6 is: "?6. On°""i"'Objecte encore icy sans fon-
dement, que selon moy tout ee que Dieu peut faire, doit itre 
tait necesaairement. Comme si l'on ignoroit que j'ay refute 
cela solidement dans la Theodiaee, et que J'ay renverse l'opin-
ion de ceux qui soutiennent qu'il n•y a rien de possible, que 
ce qui arrive e:f'f'ectivement, com:me ant fait deja quelques an-
ciens Philosophes, et entre autres D1odore ches Oiceron. On 
con1'ond la necessite morale, qui vient du ohoix du meilleur, 
avee la necessite absolue; on con.fond la volonte avec la puis-
sance de Dieu. Il peut produire tout possible. ou ce qui 
n'implique point de contradiction; mais 11 peut produire le 
meilleur entre les possi.blas. Voyes ce que j'ay dit oy dessue 
num. 9. et num. ?4.n lb~d., VII. p. 409. 
89n74. De l'f!Jtendue a la duree, non valet coneequentia. 
0uand l'etendue de la matiere n'auroit point de bornes, 11 ne 
s'enauit point que sa duree n•en ait pas non plus, pas mime 
en arriere, c•est ii dire, qu'elle n's.it point du de commence-
ment. Si la nature des choses dans le total, est de croitre 
uni.tonaement en perfection, l'univers dee creatures doit avoir 
commence. Alnei il y aura des raisona pour limiter la duree 
des choses, quand meme 11 n'y en auroit point pour en limiter 
i•etendue. De plus, le commencement du monde ne deroge point 
?l 
what should be particularly noted within these passages is 
that, according to Leibniz: 
(l) It is unlikely that God will not limit the extension 
ot matter. 
(2) God has thought it better to set no bounds to matter. 
Yet, why does Leibniz believe this to be the case? Leibniz 
posits at least two reasons. To explicate these reasons, it 
is necessary to examine two sets or texts. The first set of 
texts is the following: 
21. There is no possible reEJ:son, that can limit 
the quantity ot mataer; and theretore such limitation 
can have no place.9 
22. And supposing an arbitrary limitation ot 
the quantity ot matter, something might always be 
added to it without derogating from the perfection 
ot those things which do alread;y exist; and conse-
quently something must always be added, in order to 
act according to the p~inciple ot the perfection of 
the divine operations.~! 
23. And therefore it cannot be said, that the 
present quantity of matter is the fittest tor the 
present constitution of things. And supposing it 
were, it would follow that this present constitu-
tion of things would not be the fittest absolutely, 
a l'infinite de la duree a parte post, OU dans la suite; mais 
las bornes de l'univers derogeroient a l'intinite de eon eten-
due. Ains1 il est plus raisonnable d'en poser un commencement 
que d' e.n admettre des bornes, a fin de conserver dans l •un et 
dans i•autre le oaractere d'un Auteur in.f'ini.tt Ibid., VII, p. 
408. -
90n21. Il n•y a point de raison possible, qui puisse limi-
ter la quantite de la matiere. Ainsi cette limitation ne sau-
roit avoir lieu." Ibid., VII, P• 3?4. 
91022. Et suppose cette limitation arbitraire, on pourroit 
toustjours ajouter quelque chose sa"ns deroger i. la perfection 
des ohoaes qui sont deja: et par cons,quent 11 taudra tousjours 
~ ajouter quelque chose, pour a.gir auivant le prinoipe de la 
perfection des operations divines.'* nli• 
it it hinders God from using more matter. It were 
therefore better to choose another9oonet1tution ot things, capable or something more. 2 
?2 
Now, according to Leibniz, there is no possible reason that 
oan limit the quantity ot matter. But, suppose that there is 
an arbitrary limitation or matter and suppose that the limita-
tion is the fittest tor the present constitution ot things. 
Then it is possible that something may be added to the present 
perfection of things which do exist. Given the tact that 
some thing ma;y be added to the present constitution or things, 
it cannot be said, that the present quantity ot matter is the 
fittest for the present constitution of things. It the pre-
sent limited quantit7 of matter were the fittest tor the pre-
sent constitution ot things, 1t would not follow that this 
present constitution ot things is the fittest absolutely. If 
the present constitution of things is not the fittest abso-
lutely, then it hinders God from using more matter. It the 
present constitution ot things hinders God from using more 
matter, it would be better to choose another constitution ot 
things capable of something more. 
1'he second set or texts consists of but one text, which 
text ie: 
9. I had observed, that by lessening the quan-
tit7 of matter, the quantity ot objects, upon which 
God may exercise his goodness, will be lessen•d. 
92"23. Ainsi on ne sauroit dire que la presente quantite 
de la matiere est la plus convenable pour leur presente consti-
tution. Et quand mime cela seroit, 11 a•enauivroit que cette 
presente constitutio.n des choses ne seroit point la plus con-
venable absolwnent, si elle empeche d'emplo7er plus de matiere; 
il taudroit done en choisir une autre, capable de qualque 
chose de plus." ~· 
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The author answers, that instead or matter, there· 
are other things in the void space, on which God may 
exercise his goodness. Be it so: tho' I don't grant 
it; for I hold that every created substance is atten-
ded with matter. However let it be so: I answer, that 
more matter was coneistent with those same things; 
and consequently the said objects will still be les-
sened. The instance ot a greater number ot men, or 
animals, is not to the purpose; tor the~ would fill 
up place, in exclusion of other thinga.~3 
'l'he main point to be noted therein is that on Leibniz's View, 
by lessening the quantity ot matter, the quqntity or ob~ecta 
upon which God may exercise llis goodness will be lessened. 
Generally speaking, the reasons, as to why Ijeibniz believes 
that the extension ot matter is unlimited, number two, namely: 
(1) the present constitution of things would not be the 
fittest absolutely (that ie, this would not be the 
best possible world) 
(2) by lessening the quantity ot matter, the quantity ot 
objects upon which God may exercise Bis goodness, 
would be lessened. 
But absolutely speaking, it appears that the universe oouldbbe 
finite in extension. \11th this in mind, let ue reView these 
passages: 
93u9. J'avoie remarque, qu'en diminua.nt la quantite de 
la matiere, on diminue la quantite des objects, ou Dieu peut 
exercer sa bonte. On me repond, qu•au lieu de la aatiere, 
il y a d'autrea choses dans le vu.ide, ou 11 ne laiase pas de 
i•exercer. Soit. Quoyque je n'en demeure point d'a~cord, 
oar je tiens que toute substance cre§e eat aocompagnee de 
Matiere. Mais aoit, dis-je; je repond.a, que plus de matiere 
etoit compatible avec ces memee choses, et par consequent, 
o•est tous~ours diminuer le dit objet. L'instance d'un plus 
grand. nombre d'hommes ou d'animaux ne oonvient point, car ils 
oteroient la place a d•autree choses." Ibid., VII, P• 365. 
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29. I have demonstrated that space is nothing 
else but an order or the existence of things, observed 
as existing together; and therefore the fiction of a 
material finite universe, moving forward in an infin-
ite empt7 space, cannot be admitted. It is altogether 
unreasonable and impracticable. For, besides that 
there is no real apace out of the material universe; 
such an action would be without any design in it: it 
would be working without doing anything, aRendo f1h1i 
~· There would happen no change, whic coui fie 
~ved by 8.nJ person whatsoever. 1'hese are imagi-
nations ot philosophers who have incomplete notions, 
who make space an absolute reality. Mere mathemati-
cians, who are only taken up with the conceits ot 
imagination, are apt to forge suoh_Dotions; but they 
are destro7ed by superior reasons.'.14 
30. Absolutely speaking, it appears that God can 
make the material universe t1nite in extension; but 
the contrary appears more agreeable to his wisdom.95 
Absolutely speaking, it appears that God can make the material 
universe f'inite in exten.sion. That is, it is possible to frame 
within the imagination the idea of a. finite material universe. 
SUch imagination is destroyed by superior reasons, namel7 
those ot God. So, given the tact that the extension of matter 
is unlimited, it does not f'ollow that the duration or matter 
94u29. J•ay demontre que l'espace n'est autre chose qu•un 
ordre de l'exiatenoe des choses, ~ui se remarque dana leur 
simultaneite. Ainsi la Fiction d un Univers aateriel tini, 
qui se promene tout entier dans un espaoe vu1de 1ntin1, ne 
aauroit etre ad.mise. Elle est tout a tait deraiaonnable et 
impraticable. Car outre qu'il n•7 a point d'espace reel hors 
de l'univers materiel, une telle action seroit sans but; ce 
seroit travailler sans rien ta.ire, agendo n1h1l agere. Il ne 
produiroit aucun changement observable par qui que ce aoit. 
Ce sort des imaginations dee Philosophes a notions incompletes, 
qui ae font de l'espace une realite absolue. Lea simples Mathe-
maticiens, qui ne s•occupent que de ~ewe de l'illlagination, sont 
capables de ee forger de telles notions; maia elles eont detru-
ites par des ra1sons superieures." Ibid., VII, pp. 395-96. 
95"30. Ab$oluraent parlant, 11 paroit qua Dieu peut faire 
l'univers mate~iel tini en extension, mais le contra.ire paroist 
plus contorae a sa sagesse." ~· 
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is alao unlimited. Given the fact that the extension of 
matter is unlimited, it does not follow that matter has no 
beginning. Tb.ere is a reason to limit the duration ot things 
--that is, it it is the nature or things in the whole to grow 
unitorm.17 in perfection, the universe ot creatures must have 
had a beginning--even though there are none to limit their 
extension. 1rhe world• s having a beginning does not detract 
trom the 1nfinit7 of its duration. Bounds ot the universe 
would detract from the infinity ot its extension. 
Since we are attempting to obtain the matching presuppo-
si tiona, let us immediately proceed onto renew ot additional 
texts concerning motion. Following these, a summary of Leib-
niz's position with regard to space, matter, motion and time 
will be presented so as to enable us to locate the seven 
matching presuppositions with comparative ease. 
The texts concerning motion are: 
52. In order to prove that space, without 
bodies, is an absolute reality; the author ob~ected, 
that a finite material universe might move forward. 
in space. I answered, it does not appear reasonable 
that the material universe should be t1n1te; and, 
though we should suppose it to be finite; 7et 'tia 
unreasonable it should have motion 8J17 otherwise, 
than as it& parts change their situation aaong them-
selves; because such a motion would produce no change 
that could be observed, and would be wi~hout design. 
•tis another thing. whan its parts change their 
situation among themselves; for then there is a motion 
in space; but it consists in the order ot relations 
which are changed. The author replies now, that the 
reality or motion does not depend upon being obeervedJ 
and that a ship may go forward, and 7et a man, who is 
in the ship, may not perceive it. I answer, motion 
does not indeed depend upon being observed; but 1t does 
depend upon it being possible to be observed. 1'here 
is no motion, when there is no change at all. The 
contrary opinion is grounded upon the supposition 
ot a real absolute space, which I have demonstra-
tively refuted by the princi~le ot the want or a 
sui'ticient reason ot things.96 
31. I don't grant that every finite is movable. 
According to the b1'pothesis of my adversaries them-
selves, a part or apace, though finite, is not .mov-
able, What is mon.ble must be capable ot changing 
its situation with respect to something else, and 
to be in a new state discernible trom the tirsta 
otherwise the change is but a fiction. A movable 
finite, must therefore be part of another finite, 
in order that any change may happen which can be 
observed.~? 
In order to prove that space without bodies ia an absolute 
reality, Samuel Clark noted that a tinite material universe 
might move forward in space. To Leibniz, it does not appear 
96«52. Pour prouver que l'Espace sans lee corps est quel-
que realiti absolu, on m•avoit objecti que l'univers materiel 
fini se pourroit promener dans l'espaoe. J'D.7 repondu, qu'il 
ne pe.roit point raisonnable que l'univers materiel soit tini; 
et quand on le supposeroit, 11 eat deraisonn.able qu'il ait de 
mouvement, autrement qu'en tant que aes parties changent de 
situation entre elles: parce qu•un tel mouvement ne produiroit 
aucun changement observable, et seroit sans but. Autre chose 
est quand see parties changent de situation entr'elle•, car 
alors on 7•reconnoist UD mouvement dana l'eapace, mais consiste 
dans l order des rapports, qui sont changis. On replique main-
tenant, que la veritf du mouvement est ind.ipendante de l'obser-
vation, et qu•un vaisseau peut avanoer sans que celu.y qui est 
dedans s•en apercoive. Je reponds que le mouvement est 1nde-
pendant de l'obseration, mais qu'il n'est point independent 
de l'observabilite. Il n•7 a point de mouvement, quand 11 n•y 
a point de changement observable. Et meme quaad 11 n•y a point 
de changement observable, 11 n•y a point de changement de tout. 
Le oontraire est tonde sur la supposition d'un Eapace reel ab-
eolu, que j'ay retuti demonetrativement par le principe du 
beaoin d'une raison suftisante des choses." Ibid., VII, PP• 
40J-04. 
97"31. Je n'accorde point que tout tini est mobile. Et 
selon l'h;ypothese m&me des adversa1ree, une partie de l'espace, 
quoyque tinie, n'est point mobile. Il taut que oe qu1 est 
mobile, puisse changer de situation par rapport a quelque autre 
obose, et qu•11 puisse arriver un 'tat nouveau disoernable du 
premier: autrement le changement est une fiction. Ainsi 11 
taut qu•un tini mobile tasse p&rtie d•u.n autre, a tin qu•11 
puisse arriver un changement observable." ll!!.4•• VII, p. 396. 
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reasonable that the material universe should be finite,· even 
though one would want to suppose it so. It is, according to 
Leibllia, unreasonable to suppose the material universe has 
~ motion other than the motion of its parts changing their 
situation among themselves. Not every finite is movable. 
What is movable must be capable or cllanging its situation 
with respect to something, and to be in a new state discern-
ible trom the first. A finite material iuniverse moVing forward 
would produce no change that could be observed,aand would be 
without design. Motion does not depend upon being observed 
but rather it depends upon it being possible to be observed. 
There is no motion where there is no change that can be ob-
served. And when there is no change that can be observed, 
there is no change at all. 
Let us now summarize the Leibnizian position with regard 
to space, matter, motion and time so as to be better able to 
ma.ke obvious the presuppositions ot the position. 
The extension ot matter is unlimited. The unlimited 
extene1on of matter has a beginni.ng and given the fact that 
the extension of matter has a beginning. it has an infinite 
duration. Tb.ere is no created substance wholly destitute ot 
matter. There 1s no space where there is no matter. Although 
space and matter ditter, they are inseparable. Extension, 
being the quantity of space, appears aa a plurality of things 
whose togetherness is continuous. 'l'he connection of the 
plurality of things ie not necessary becauae one can take away 
something an4 substitute something else tor it without making 
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much ditf'erence. Thia is to say that different things· can 
enter into the aame relation of co-existence. The order of 
co-existence is, in general, a simple relation of one thing 
to another or the distance of one thing from another thing. 
A co-existing thing can change its relation to a nWDber ot 
other co-existing things (fixed existents) which do not change 
their relation among themselves. If a "newly-comen thing 
acquires the same relation to the other co-existing tbing(a), 
as the former had, one then says that it has come into the 
place of the .former thing. It the cause or change of situa-
tion is within the body, that body is truly in motion. It a 
body is truly in motion, then the situation of other bodies, 
with res:veot to it, will be changed though the cause of tha.t 
change is not in them. lt is unreasonable to suppose that 
the material universe has any motion other than the motion 
ot its parts changing their situation among themselves. \.lb.at 
is movable must be capable of changing its situation with 
respect to something, and to be in a new state (or position) 
discernible from the first. A movable finite must be part of 
another finite, so that any change that may happen may be 
possibly observed. Those things which have such a relation 
to these fixed existents, as others bad to them before, have 
now the same place which those others had. Space is that 
which comprehends all those places. 
In View ot this summary, let us list the 1'matching 11 pre-
suppositions of Leibniz's position to those of the question. 
1'hus: 
?9 
(l) Space, llll.ltter, motion and time are created a1.mul-
taneously {that is, a possible world is actualized). 
(2) Space and. matter are inseparable. 
(3) There is no space where there is no matter. 
(4) Space is an idealization of the existing relations 
among contemporaneous thinp.h 
(5) The extension ot matter 1s unlimited. 
(6) It is unreasonable to suppose that the material uni-
verse has any motion other tban that of its parts 
changing their situation among themselves. 
(7) This is not a aeaningtul inqui.17, given (l) through 
(6). 
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